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V této práci analyzuji současné politiky paměti na základě jejich časové orientace vůči 
konceptu konce dějin. K této analýze využiji teorie vnímání času a sociální dimenze 
identity Henriho Bergsona a Jean-Paul Sartra, kterou aplikuji na práci Pierra Nory. Na 
druhé straně se pokusím spojit tyto filosofické koncepty s narativním přístupem Ricouera a 
MacIntyra. Tato teoretická část práce mi následně umožní zaměřit se na otázku politické 
temporality, orientované k nad-světské věčnosti, k budoucnosti či minulosti a konfrontovat 
tyto s hypotézou o konci dějin Francise Fukuyamy. 
Politiky paměti se zde dostává zvláštního postavení. V jednom případě se mohou 
orientovat na minulost a konec dějin zcela odmítnout; ve druhém mohou mít ambici 
společnost z dějin, bolestivě přítomných v živé paměti, vyléčit, a napomoci tak konsolidaci 
post-historické reality. Paradoxně ovšem oba dva přístupy politik paměti umožňují dějinám 






Abstract (in English): 
In this paper I will analyze contemporary politics of memory on the basis of their temporal 
orientation face to face to the end of history. I will follow on the one hand theories of 
perception of time in regards of social dimension of an agent´s identity of Henri Bergson 
and Jean-Paul Sartre applied on Pierre Nora´s work, and on the other hand I will try to join 
those philosophical concepts with Ricouer´s and MacIntyre´s narrative approach. This 
theoretical base will subsequently allow me to elaborate on political temporality oriented to 
the sacred eternity, to the future or to the past and confront it with the hypothesis of the end 
of history as conceptualized by Francis Fukuyama.  
Politics of memory gains in this classification a peculiar status – being oriented either 
towards the past denying the end of history, or oriented towards diffused individualized 
future. The second type of politics of memory aims to heal society from history, still 
present in painful memory, and support establishing of post-historic reality. Paradoxically, 
I will argue, both types of politics of memory allow history in Fukuyma´s sense to pass the 
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I remember one significant conversation from my late childhood when I sat in a park with my peers 
discussing our life perspectives. All of us from relatively secured middle class background, having 
been brought up to enroll in universities and choose what to do for a living by ourselves, we, 
nonetheless, felt dissatisfied. For hours we continued with the leitmotiv of how easy it was for 
dissidents during normalization to choose their paths, to be men of their faith and deeds. I am not 
mentioning this rather embarrassing episode from my memory to praise dissidents or to speak about 
spoiled and bored high school students but to illustrate that howsoever is the concept of the end of 
history mocked and called in question, it has always been intuitively experienced by my generation, be 
it correct or not. I believe the reason for it lies to a great extent in memory culture the first post-
communist generation has been brought up in. Politics of memory or diffused projects 
commemorating the past and introducing history have in fact two options, and so had we.  
First, to refuse the end of history as ideological or just mistaken hypothesis and join the history as next 
chapters of it, educate young people as direct successors in the story told; this paradigm opened a 
range of opportunities for us to become heirs of dissent. After all, even if we could not have possibly 
become our childhood heroes, communists still haven't been banned as a party, there still have been 
anti-ciganists, Russian dissent has been needed to be helped or there has been gender inequality in 
hierarchy of Catholic Church.  
The second option is to accept the end of history and to perceive history projects only as part of what 
we could have called education to democracy, pursuing society to eschew unliberal inclinations, drugs, 
bullying peers, disrespect to the elderly, etc.; for us it meant to put up with the fact there is only a little 
left and identify with offered narratives of dissidents´ political activism as with mere good examples 
of morality educating young people like us to do what they feel as right, together with projects 
concerning ecological, psychological, social or health issues - to study strenuously, to work on our 
relationships, to support humanitarian aid, to recycle waste, to use condoms, to play in an anti-fascist 
reggae band and so forth.  
Either ways, history is an important part of education of citizens and of the culture of a society. 
Recently, memory of the 20th century as a rationale of society has been thoroughly scrutinized over 
Europe with various results. So called identitarian politics of memory criticize liberal politics of 
memory and vice versa. What is interesting is that the critiques of the opposing camps usually accept 
the analysis of the other condemning the considered consequences. In this paper I want to focus on 
both of them, arguing they are of the same structure in fact. The main thesis of this paper will be the 
paradox that occurs within liberal politics of memory, rendering the same as the identitarian ones, 
since the political temporality has changed and the orientation to the past can only create a meaning of 
enduring political narrative, overtly or not.  
We can divide the text into three main parts. In the first part, I will introduce theories regarding the 
role of time and narrative in a society. I will start with a theoretician who in general brought the 
concept of memory on the stage. Until Pierre Nora the main theme was in general all about the past as 
such. I will argue that his theory of two intertwined concepts resembles Bergson´s thoughts about 
qualitative difference between pure time and space, with memory on the side of time and history on 
that of space. Subsequently I will introduce Ricoeur's narrative approach and broaden it from the 
individual level to the social level. This allows me to rehabilitate national narrative as the primary 
collective site of memory in Nora´s sense in current political environment. In the second part, I will 
use concepts from the first two chapters to classify politics in general as oriented towards the future, 
towards the past and towards supra mundane religious time. Together with political temporalities, we 
will look shortly on the concept of the end of history and its role in social narratives. The third part of 
this work will be focused exclusively on the past temporality of politics. Firstly, we will see a case of 
Polish politics of memory representing the identitarian type of memory politics and its denial of the 
end of history. Subsequently we will juxtapose it to the liberal politics of memory which, tacitly or 
not, accepts and uses the end of history for its purposes. By their own conceptualizations and critiques 
of the other they should have been on exactly diverse temporalities of narratives. Nevertheless we will 
see whether it is possible or not that thay assume a shared orientation towards the past. 
Author's note 
This paper started in the “lived time” in Warsaw, where I headed to study Polish politics of memory 
during the turbulent winter semester 2015. Meeting and working with people from within the Warsaw 
Rising Museum1 I could not have to get rid of the idea that the liberal critique of it has gone amiss, 
since it has been conveying the liberal pole of the orientation to the past as well, although differently. 
Having returned to Prague again, I started to work as an editor for Memory of Nations2 and by a 
coincidence caused by my family situation simultaneously joined so called reminiscence therapy3 with 
my grandmother. Memory of Nations, (deemed to be in many aspects the opposite of governmental 
politics of memory in Poland) if confronted with the therapeutic methods and narratives of co-patients, 
seemed to me to follow the same narrative structure and bringing back - although inadvertently and as 
a mere side effect - the same megalothymiac grand-narratives to be joined. This paper is trying to 











                                                          
1 http://www.1944.pl/ 
2 http://www.pametnaroda.cz/page/index/title/what-is-memory-of-nations 
3 Reminiscence therapy work together with people with Alzheimer disease or dementia and their carers by 
situating people who are on the everyday basis only being cared of (and often perceived themselves as a 
burden for their relatives) into the role of witnesses recalling old days, bringing the figure of “the elderly 
narrators” on stage. (http://www.reminiscencnicentrum.cz/O-nas-rc) 
1. Time and human perception 
Much has been written about memory in the last few decades. So much that it is hardly anything else 
than an author´s choice to lead the line of argumentation within the bulk of memory studies. Firstly, I 
will focus on the best known classic of memory studies, Pierre Nora, to follow the theoretic frame 
within which we could intelligibly speak about politics of memory itself. Subsequently, I will in this 
chapter proceed to Bergson´s and Nietzsche´s theories concerning social dimension of human 
temporality, paving the way for the theory of narrative identity, crucial for politics of memory from 
another viewpoint.  
1.1. On memory and history 
First of all, Pierre Nora believes that before modernity, there was what we could have called 
environments of memory (milieux de memoire), “that has long assured the transmission and 
conservation of collectively remembered values, [...] ideologies that prepared a smooth passage from 
the past to the future.” (Nora 1989:7) As the most archetypal examples he gives French peasants 
before nationalization and urbanization, which has faded away in 18th century, and Jewish nation until 
after Shoah that he even called with an epithet “peoples of memory”. This sense for collectively driven 
life without history as such, embedded in the framework of shared rituals, values and meanings has 
been, Nora notes regretfully, definitively gone.  
Nora, with many others, perceives history – a science that furnishes evidence of truth of particular 
(national) story – as a rationale of a given society, as the raison d’état of some states and their regimes 
or particular nationally oriented politics. With this deep bond with current political affairs we can see 
that milieux de memoire, to use his own terms, really are gone – no political unity can now solidly 
argue with exclusive essential grounds (he himself also comprehends this change as a shift from 
nation-state to modern society-state). According to him, politics is legitimated by historical facts 
(important is that the battle fought in name of a “nation” or a “state” really took place in this and this 
year) and not by memory (i.e. shared framework of continually evolving meanings and signs, or 
shortly, by shared world in a phenomenological sense). 
But after the first modern nationalist period, Nora argues, the state has been tied with society in a 
political sense and not with nation. “[...] the coupling of state and nation was gradually replaced by the 
coupling of state and society – [...] history was transformed, spectacularly, from the tradition of 
memory it had become into the self-knowledge of society.” (Nora 1989:11) History, present in every 
realm of social life from education to diplomacy, has become an important part of a national identity 
of citizens as individuals. Nora on many places of the text claims the shift from memory to history is 
the seam side of the process at the end of memory became a purely private phenomenon.  
Albeit memory is gone as a structural essence of society, memory in a secondary sense is possible to 
trace in modern societies as a social faculty, that  
“remains in permanent evolution, open to dialectic of remembering and forgetting, 
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, 
susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived, [...] perpetually actual 
phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present [...], affective and magical, only 
accommodates those facts that suit it, it nourishes recollections that may be out of focus or 
telescopic, global or detached, particular or symbolic – responsive to each avenue of 
conveyance or phenomenal screen, to every censorship or projection.” (Nora 1989:8)  
The secondary sense of the term is here defined in counterposition to the concept of history, the 
dominating principle of current societies. Nora uses the term of history to convey an orientation on the 
past through historical facts as precisely reconstructed as possible and links it with a metaphor of an 
archive4. Significantly, he equates memory to poetry and history to prose.  
Pierre Nora edited a volume on French sites of memory – places where memory and history meet in 
opaque and intermingled way, although we can find there neither of them in the pure form. Sites of 
memory constitute themselves in three senses – material, symbolic and functional. A material layer 
refers to the presence of a site in physical reality (however immaterial the particular site might occur – 
such as a minute of silence – it takes place in a spatiotemporal world), while a symbolical layer grasps 
an aura and emotional burdens – let us to say that it provides the site with a meaning in a web of signs 
in a given society –, and a functional layer represents the usage of the site – educational, burial, that of 
storage and so on. And such a threefold site takes place through both a fixation on the side of the given 
history and shifting meaning provided by a shared worldview. Sites of memory constitute signs in a 
narrative of a society, remind of the past but exist in the present and join them together. Sites of 
memory, argues Nora obscurely, exist as mere remnants of (usually hypothetical) milieux de memoire.  
We can use a recent Czech example to trace the diffused relationship of history in a sense “bygone 
world” and “our history, our past” with a memory of witnesses, regardless whether direct or 
secondary5. In his book about Czech ways of remembering Kamil Činátl considers why are fans of 
broadly watched serial story Vyprávěj concerned more with tiny historical details than a political 
development in Czechoslovakia (the serial is tracing the evolution of the regime year after year on the 
background of a family story of “ordinary people”). Viewers are debating requisites of the artwork as 
following: “Today I watched the episode “Home Theater” again and I noticed that during the StB 
house search at Tonda´s and Zuzka´s little Majda has the same bedclothes in her bed as I used to have 
[...]” or “So I gawk at the scenes of a series and nostalgically remember when I see the same cup my 
grandpa made my cocoa to. (Činátl 2014: 166) Bedclothes and cups are typical sites of memory. They 
as physical objects common in 1970s tell something to people for who they were part of everyday 
sceneries. Symbolically they refer to realities of normalization and “way of living” those days in the 
broadest sense. And functionally they make this historical serial movie highly attractive and believable 
(by evoking personal memories as mentioned), so to quote one man at a fan page: “They just shoot our 
lives!” (Činátl 2014: 154). As Nora would argue, memory and history meet together in those cups and 
bed clothes used in a TV series. 
That approach follows a memory discourse linked to Maurice Halbwachs and his essays on collective 
memory as a social framework that underlies individual memory itself. Collective memory in his sense 
is a way of perception and ordering of what later became memories, all-encompassing horizon in 
which is one´s thinking always already embedded – individual memories and thoughts are socially 
pre-formed (Erll 2011). Because our cups and bed-clothes were not merely a matter of personal 
properties but they were shared by the society, they could occur in the serial with such a power, so that 
commentaries above quoted make sense (to write such a commentary about my grandparents´ house 
that is just behind “those trees” wouldn´t be but idiosyncratic nostalgia).    
                                                          
4 We have to keep in mind that this text was engendered in late 80s and current strong cooperation between 
social sciences was only at that time arising and Nora thus operates with the term of history in strong hard-
scientific way. 
5 I draw up this difference so to anticipate an objection that the shared memory can be common only for those 
who have directly “been there”; I am referring to the concept of communicative memory and second-
generation memory. (cp. Erll 2011)  
To summarize, memory is usually exercised as either a framework of meanings orienting individuals 
in the world or as ungraspable practise of this orientation. Usually are these senses amalgamated – and 
since I do not intend to plunge into multiple meanings of the word in this paper, for now it is sufficient 
to anticipate memory as a side oriented towards action and meaning, whereas history as a side oriented 
towards theory and facts. Nora himself, analyzing a concrete lieu de memoire, follow fluid-static, 
diachronic-synchronic, living-dead, concrete-abstract, subjective-objective, poetry-prose 
argumentative foundation. Nevertheless, he himself admits that hybrid sites of memory claiming the 
honour to be both deeply rooted in one´s individual life and  to be a remark and a proof of historically 
unbiased data are “no longer quite alive, yet not dead, like shells on the shore when the sea of living 
memory has receded.” (Nora 1989:12) 
1.2. On the diachronic Self 
An analysis that seems at the first sight to be completely detached from our investigation can show us 
a lot. Henri Bergson is not occupied by history or society. In an essay I am referring to, On Immediate 
Data of Consciousness, he elaborates on human mental states facing the question of duration. 
According to him, all unities we perceive are united in our mind. The physical object I see in front of 
me I see as an object because I perceive it as united in the object. But Bergson is not really concerned 
with physical realities. The interesting thing is what he finds once he deals purely with states of mind 
instead.  
There are two different kinds of duration in his thought. Analyzing perception of number he shows 
some notions of time are in fact driven by the idea of space. For counting, one has to juxtapose every 
single item they are counting. And this juxtaposing in fact means that the counter is so to say above 
those items lined up next to each other. Every unit taken as divisible “is as such only because [it is] 
regarded as extended in space.” (Bergson 2001: 90) The homogenous time in which concrete events or 
items take place, the calendar time, is measurable, ordered, external, divisible and therefore “is nothing 
but space, and pure duration is something different.” (Bergson 2001: 90) Pure duration is only 
qualitative, and nothing quantitative is connected to it. He shows it with the example of melody. While 
counting tones, we miss it. We have to be “there” at the very end of it, along with it, and by taking off 
one single tone we do not lose only that tone but the whole melody. Poetically enough, the same 
theory (actually with the same example) uses Jean Paul Sartre in Nausea: 
“so strong is the necessity of this music: nothing can interrupt it, nothing which comes from 
this time in which the world has fallen; it will stop of itself, as if by order. If I love this 
beautiful voice it is especially because of that: it is neither for its fullness nor its sadness, 
rather because it is the event for which so many notes have been preparing, from so far away, 
dying that it might be born [...][Music] filled the room with its metallic transparency, crushing 
our miserable time against the walls. I am in the music. [...]The last chord has died away. In 
the brief silence which follows I feel strongly that there it is, that something has happened.” 
(Sartre 1969: 29) 
There are two aspects of our mental states as well. The first layer is externalized and solidified among 
others by language. Although I am always on the very end (of my life) deeply and qualitatively as I am 
on the very end of a melody while listening to it, to be able to speak and socialize, I do petrify my 
“melody” (life) into “tones” (events), reify my inner mental states and ideas. The social time, as he 
puts it, takes place in space as a time-quantity open to being ordered and counted.  
The reason why I before used Sartre and not directly Bergson himself to demonstrate the thought, was 
because Sartre (or to be precise, his alter-ego Antoin Roquentin) will be now shortly the perfect guide 
to interconnect Bergson´s ideas of “two times” with a theory of narrative identity and memory. 
While recalling strong emotions and exaltation connected to listening jazz, Sartre shortly claims: “I am 
so happy when a Negress sings: what summits would I not reach if my own life made the subject of 
the melody” (Sartre 1969: 42) And there he considers:  
“[...]for the most banal even to become an adventure, you must (and this is enough) begin to 
recount it. This is what fools people: a man is always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded by 
his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything that happens to him through them; and 
he tries to live his own life as if he were telling a story. But you have to choose: live or tell.” 
(Sartre 1969: 43)  
Antoin Roquetin tries to “live” and denies “narrating” – and he finds himself necessarily lone and 
unable to speak with others. He is even surprised how easily “ordinary” people interact: “If they are 
asked what they did yesterday, they aren’t embarrassed: they bring you up to date in a few words. If I 
were in their place, I’d fall over myself.” (Sartre 1969: 17) 
Even his own memory needs to order while recalling, he, annoyed, notices:  
“I fish one [memory] out, again I see the scenery, the characters, the attitudes. I stop suddenly: 
there is a flaw, I have seen a word pierce through the web of sensations. I suppose that this 
word will soon take the place of several images I love. I must stop quickly and think of 
something else; I don’t want to tire my memories. In vain; the next time I evoke them a good 
part will be congealed.” (Sartre 1969: 38)  
With Sartre´s dichotomy between “living” and “narrating”, it is only plausible to elaborate shortly on 
thinking of Friedrich Nietzsche who is looking for a balance between so called life and history, 
understood as a binary opposition of future-oriented principle that aims one´s own action and piety-
based voluntary action of treasuring up the past, retrospectively. He opens his essay with a scale 
resembling Nora´s consideration of fully historical or fully memorial community, but in place of 
history he puts remembering (meant as storing memories) and in that of memory he puts forgetting (as 
being always enduring himself but unaware of the notion of how he has become what he is). 
(Nietzsche 1874:80)  
History, however, as a craft of remembering, could be manifested in three ways in society. The first of 
them is history of monumental form (oriented towards life) which is akin to thinking of ancient 
Greeks. It faces the danger of the omnipotence of uncritically accepted myth by which it is driven to 
heroic deeds and eternity of the great – in short, society based purely and essentially on monumental 
form of historicity would be blind to reality and in a certain sense petrified by its canon6. History of 
antiquarian form, on the other hand, conserving and storing the past both from distance and with awe 
and sense of duty face to face to those who paved the way for us would lead, according to Nietzsche, 
to a society without living spontaneous creativity7. The idea of the third one, the critical history, is 
very close to our perception of history as an explanatory science, not only a canonizing and archiving 
procedure, but rather explaining (both present and past) social reality as historically traced 
                                                          
6 We will later see this approach is the Polish one. 
7We will later see this approach is partly the Czech one. 
phenomenon8. On the basis of either preferring the preservative history to active deeds or by defining 
the society by the past rather than by the future, Nietzsche itemizes five main vices of such society – 
every one of them is anchored in supremacy of a monolithic structure that restrains a spontaneous 
subject:  
“When the sense of history rules without restraint and drags with it all consequences, it 
uproots the future, because it destroys illusions and takes from existing things the atmosphere 
in which they alone can live. Historical justice, even if it is practised truly and with a purity of 
conviction, is therefore a fearful virtue, because it always undermines living and brings about 
its downfall.” (Nietzsche 1874:116) 
History for Nietzsche has to be in life´s service to contribute to an healthy independent culture and is 
therefore subordinated to it. They both need each other, though, and problem arises when one 
completely subdues the other.  
With those three essays in mind, it could now be easier for us to jump into the role of narratives in 
personal and social identity. In society we deal with a perfectly Bergsonian problem of both the inner 
self forever flying and in motion, and its social identity structured and at least partly petrified. I will 
try to show that a person, deriving their identity from these two aspects of diachronic myself (between 
“life” and “narrative”), as well as a society taken as a subject cannot avoid connecting the past with the 















                                                          
8 We will later see this approach goes in general against both types of politics of memory. 
2. The narrative perspective 
 
„I could recount grand premieres...But everything, what is not connected to problems of our 
age, pales by our stringent criteria of what have been significant. By now, men of my youth, 
attracting my attention to literature, appear to me less important than those, who decoyed me 
towards reality.9” (Zweig 1943:116) 
“[...] But today, ex post, I know it was [the arrow] that was the most important, so in telling 
this I move it to the forefront, from a myriad of undifferentiated facts I extract the 
configuration of the future. But how can one describe something except ex post? Can nothing 
be ever truly expressed, rendered in its anonymous becoming, can no one ever render the 
babbling of the nascent moment, how is it that, born out of chaos, we can never encounter it 
again, no sooner do we look than order . . . and form . . . are born under our very eyes? No 
matter.” (Gombrowicz 1965:25) 
“The values placed by the heroes/victims on naming the transgressors are rooted in their 
feelings of being violated just as much as it has to do with their sense that a clear definition of 
the past is relevant for future generations, in order to help them orient themselves in the stream 
of historical events.” (Witeska- Młynarczyk 2014:158) 
 
Common feature of these three snippets is plain enough. All of them qualify order as a vein of the past 
creating one´s orientation in the world. Stephan Zweig writes his biography from a perspective of a 
witness of great events and an everyday development of people´s mentality at the turn of the 19th and 
20th century – and as that he applies the great European narrative of that age to his own life story as a 
framework and simultaneously appropriates his apprehension of his own past to it. In accordance with 
Henri Bergson we could use this exact sentence to demonstrate how from the present perspective is the 
past something else, something laid down and ordered (men who have oriented him towards politics 
and “activism” are for him more important now, while his young occupation with literature seems 
from the perspective of a “pacifist” as a mere useful instrument). When the past time was present, 
nothing had been clear yet, everything was of different and undecided importance.  
The second snippet is in this manner similar. Witold Gombrowicz in Cosmos claims it is possible to 
see what something is and what meaning it bears only ex post when it is connectable to other ordered 
things and that it is the fate of the present to be a crossover of ex post defined meaningful order and 
onward directed possible scenarios of the future that the reflexive past implies. According to him, no 
meaning we can find in the present alone as well as we cannot find the past alone without ordering it.  
The last quote is not about a single person, but rather about a whole society, but the author uses the 
same Bergson´s division and we will see that society as a unit faces the same problem of diachronic 
identity as individuals, a problem of being in different times the same and at the same time not. Anna 
Witeska-Młynarczyk, interviewing Polish former anti-communist combatants who unconsciously 
appropriated their personal memories and feelings so that to fit into the national narrative as living 
symbols of the national past, also proposes a reciprocal relation between the past, as a structured sense 
                                                          
9 As I could not find English edition by that time but was able to look into the Czech one, I used my publication 
and tentatively translated the quote by myself. 
 
and a guide, and the future, as a field of action of always already towards-an-end oriented and 
somewhere-in-the-web-of-signs located subjects.  
2.1. Temporal and causal horizon of actions 
Identity, orienting a subject in the chaotic and ungraspable world, has a lot to do with memory – we 
can say that a question “Who am I?” is tightly linked to “Where am I from?” or “How I became this?” 
referring to the bergsonian “straight line behind me”. Focusing on the faculty of mind responsible for 
gathering of the past and the future together and simultaneously not to get bogged down in the lockean 
concepts of identity, we have to speak both of partial identities (as perishable but definable social roles 
and dispositions) and also of events that happened and in which actively or passively the subject 
figured.  
Human action does not make sense until it is connected with a temporal horizon. Alasdair MacIntyre 
uses the following example: 
“What is he doing? Writing a sentence. Finishing his book. Contributing to the debate on the 
theory of action. Trying to get tenure. [...] Each of the shorter-term intentions is, and can only 
be made, intelligible by reference to some longer-term intentions.” (MacIntyre 2007:207)  
It is not only about how broad the temporal horizon of our action is. Apart from the temporal we have 
to find the causal order as well: 
“[...] “What is he doing?” The answers may with equal truth and appropriateness be 
“Digging”, “Gardening”, “Taking exercise”, “Preparing for winter” or “Pleasing his wife”. [...] 
We cannot, that is to say, characterize behaviour independently of the settings which make 
those intentions intelligible both to agents themselves and to others.” (MacIntyre 2007:206)  
Even actions which are on the first sight unintelligible are not such while interpreted by agent´s 
intentions and appropriate temporality of it (taking into account social conventions and roles). 
MacIntyre´s examples are illustrative and not controversial. But very different answers can be at stake 
concerning such questions. What am I doing, could ask a random model agent on 29th June 1985? “I 
am bending my knee”, “I am exercising”, “I am fulfilling my school obligations”, “I am enjoying 
being part of Czechoslovakian Spartakiad”, “I am supporting the political regime I live under” and so 
on. Different model agent can also 24th September 1944 in Warsaw answer that he is killing a 
defenceless old person, or killing a Nazi, or is combating against a grisly felonious regime, or is a 
faithful man following his conscience, or is taking revenge for his executed friend, or is trotting out in 
field of sight of a pretty girl and so forth ad infinitum. This will be a very important note later, while 
tracing the unapparent logic of the concept of “ordinary people” and “national heroes”.  
2.2. On framing of time through the meaning ascribed 
Narrative identity, admitting to a person both a (delimited) authorship and a role of the main character, 
has capability to cover these more or less evanescent identities by virtue of the continuity of life story. 
Paul Ricoeur argues, that  
“[...] time became human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; 
narration, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal 
experience.” (Ricoeur 1999:58)  
In other words, the continual narrative is the framework within which we perceived ourselves in 
different times and different roles as the same, no matter that always enduring and changing; and 
social schemata allow us to orient ourselves in homogenous and neutral calendar time10 and 
appropriate it to our human time of various “paces” or “epochs”. We narrate our life hitherto as events 
and periods and after the manner of narration we provide our life episodes with coherence. This 
coherence, i.e. narrative identity, refers directly to a sense ascribed to our lives and rules it. (MacIntyre 
2007)  
Reflecting on his past life, a person inadvertently smoothen the narrative through flattening memories 
so as to conform them to the inner logic of it, rationalizing them and sharpening those events that 
played a crucial role from a bird´s eye perspective (so to say it with Bergson once more), however 
contingent they might have been. This sense-producing capacity of memory is extensively being 
scrutinized currently, and we can use variety of concepts to describe it: Brockheimer speaks about 
“retrospective teleology” of one´s narrative; Greenwald about a “totalitarian ego” of narrative nature 
that gives sense to a present subject; Rumelhart argues that a person finds sense of life in so-called 
“story-schemata”, narrative structural patterns of his own past; Polkingtone introduces “symbolic 
transformation” of memories into meanings and so forth. (Erll 2011) 
Temporal identity of a person has beside of “making sense” also another pivotal function concerning 
life in temporal respect. Thru present narrating self permeates the past into the future in a form of (to a 
particular telos directed) vector. One´s past thus delimit boundaries of potential future acts. Those 
boundaries consists of imagination, dragged by inner story schemata, of need of coherence in one´s 
life (even when I decide to do something  spontaneous what is unintelligible for others, I´ll follow my 
imagery and either I´ll need to feel that this radical and unexpected step “make sense”, at least by 
making sense of that my action doesn´t make any sense) and of certain persistence grounded in 
continuous everyday existence.  
2.3. On narrative belonging 
One never experiences himself as a separate atomic subject, though.  
“One of principal ways in which we work mentally in common, I would want to argue, is by 
the process of joint narrative accrual. Even our individual autobiographies, as I have argued 
elsewhere, depend on being placed within a continuity provided by a constructed and shared 
social history in which we locate our Selves and our individual continuities.” (Bruner 1991:20)  
In conformity with Bruner we can say that born in certain time and place and belonging to certain 
environment, a man apprehend himself as intertwined in known structure of the world (cp. MacIntyre 
2007: 209). Foremost we insert our story in a broader narrative of our family – on this presumption is 
based the literary genre of saga – and outermost in the broadest narrative of humankind. In narrative 
perspective it is only credible to consider one´s identity on the ground of centre-periphery with the 
farer level the broader.  
It is only plausible to remind Stephan Zweig here. His autobiography is of high significance especially 
because his life story is to an enormous extent intertwined in the grand meta-narrative of European 
history11. From the very beginning (brought up in a wealthy Jewish family in Wien and has attending 
universities over the Europe) and over his adult life (spent mostly as being a pacifist intellectual of a 
world format) to the end (as he committed suicide in emigration in South America had lost hope vis-à-
vis to rising power of Hitler) he “was there” from within, always in the archetypal eye of the tornado. 
                                                          
10 Paul Ricoeur himself works with a division: impersonal calendar time vs. everyday lived time. 
11 Stephan Zweig with his panEuropean identity would be probably forgotten had there not the project of 
European integration because of the same reason as because of which he is a part of European canon.  
We will see this phenomenon with different life stories to play a salient role in an identity of a society 
as “the archetypes”.   
„[...] [national] narratives engender a sense of belonging and acquire emotional valence for 
individual speakers through the involvement of their self-narratives into the [national] 
narrative,” argues Witeska-Młynarczyk in a similar way. (Witeska-Młynarczyk 2014:88)  
The humankind perspective is too wide and it is impossible to identify with it, whereas family or 
neighbourhood perspectives are prevalently on the other hand too narrow and thus insufficient to give 
someone a framework for orientation in the “outside” world. Hence one looks for a perspective that 
can consolidate one´s identity vis-à-vis social reality. Later I´ll try to argue that a national perspective 
is the most constitutional one nowadays12. 
2.4. Two levels of narration 
In this moment it is inevitable to elaborate on the relation between personal (embedded in social 
framework) and social narrative (to some extent composed of personal narratives). But to tie them 
together we have to make clear the position of narrative towards memory. Narrative is a way of 
expressing “who I am” (or “who we are”) after a diachronic manner, and as such can and usually do 
work retrospectively – since I am not what I merely intend to be and my life story is not what it only 
going to be. Memory is a faculty of mind responsible for remembering – i.e. mental operation that 
after the manner of ordering rules what to remember and what to forget. As such memory is closely 
linked to our identification with certain social roles, habits and values. Narrative is therefore the 
operational ordering and associating of potential memories itself, accentuating one order and 
“storyline” over other that pale or in ultimate case definitively disappear (i.e. are potentially or actually 
forgotten). Shortly we can say that narrative is an instrument of memory that allows us to contain the 
past Selves in the present Self without voluntarily13 paying attention to “what have happened?” Our 
Self, perceived as “the last chapter so far” (let´s remember Bergson here) includes “the previous 
chapters” as a question after “why and how we have found ourselves here?” (emanating through 
socially and linguistically dependent order as would Bergson state it) all at once.  
Personal and collective narratives have in common the very structure of meaningfully associated 
events. But as we can ascribe authorship of the main character to the character itself in case of 
personal life story14, it is impossible to hold somebody responsible for diffused story of society15. The 
subject – in this case a certain society – remains in its narrative anyway “the same” (identical), 
however contra intuitive it might sound. Halbwachs argues that “each memory is a viewpoint on the 
collective memory.” (Erll 2011) Every personal narrative is in accordance with it a viewpoint on the 
collective narrative or so to say “the narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of 
narratives.” (MacIntyre 2007: 218)  
                                                          
12 So to speak about the past; concerning a special type of grand narratives oriented toward the future, other 
narrative perspectives are common as well. I will focus on them later.   
13 Term „voluntary memory” introduces Marcel Proust so that convey consciouss orientation toward personal 
history to put it in opposition with „involuntary memory” evoked by a exterior impetus. I am using the term in 
accordance with him. 
14 This statement brutally simplifies the relation between a social order and an individual – but for our 
purposes let´s let the dialectic of it aside. 
15 I could superficially introduce an approach of Michel Foucault here, based on Punish and Discipline and The 
order of things, but it also does not seem necessary. 
As well as an individual agent repress and ignore his own memories as either too traumatic or 
unintelligible and marginal, deals a society with its segments. This phenomenon we can see whenever 
the society deals with those, whose narratives don´t suit in the preferred story line of a collective. A 
small community, a family for example, usually aspires to be all-embracing; however it surely 
necessarily highlights some pattern over others. But in case of grand narratives, as those of national 
nature, that are purposefully hierarchical, we can trace more open exclusion of some perspectives. We 
can always find members, whose narratives do not suit in the meta-story, because they are either of 
different or dissent orientation. They are commonly being neglected or subdued by centres of power16. 
To illustrate this claim with an example, we can quote Witeska-Młynarczyk again. Confronted with a 
former security officer, whose perspective concerning the period before 1989 radically differs from the 
official interpretation, she draws a conclusion that his narrative schema is completely ignored by 
current Polish society17. The informant of Witeska-Młynarczyk faces both indifference and hatred 
towards his person. “[Allen Feldman argued that] formulaic and ideological depiction can leave vast 
realm of experience unnarrated and dehistorized [...] making them inaccessible to a society as a 
cultural resource.” (Witeska-Młynarczyk 2014:167) Her informant, the former security officer, thus 
never will be a really accepted member of the society with unlike and broadly accepted narrative. The 
“unnarrated and dehistorized experience” does mean nothing less than being forgotten or marginalized 
from the perspective of would-be-written history. Hence follows the well-known Benjamin´s 
proclamation that “history is written by the victors”. Witeska-Młynarczyk tries after this experience to 
disclose grand narratives in general as illusory. Their strength is not because they display reality (and 
even more as the present reality is just a tiny sector of the enduring people), but because there is such 











                                                          
16 The name “power” I am using here again in Foucault´s broad sense from Subject and Power, not just 
ascribing it to officials.  
17 Plausible to add, though, that the atmosphere of post-communistic society in Poland is strongly affected by 
memory politics of the ruling party, that explicitly pursues one particular national narrative – that of heroic 
combat against communists and their collaborators. I will expand this topic later. 
3. The split of temporalities 
We got to the point where it is necessary to interconnect the main theories that have been mentioned in 
this text so far. We met two classic theories in the first chapter, dedicated to the question of memory, 
history and time in human perception. The first was that of Pierre Nora and the division of history (as 
a structure of given cumulated facts) and memory with its subdivision (in the primary sense 
represented in milieux de memoire and secondarily conveyed as the symbolic and meaningful part of 
the past present in a society). The second was Bergson´s two notions of time (that of time-space and 
time-duration) with Satre´s shift towards narrated time contra lived time on the one side and 
Nietzsche´s further shift towards history and life on the other side.    
Pierre Nora himself connects bygone milieux de memoire with society before nationalization or with 
Jews. It is not a coincidence, since both French peasants and Jewish communities over Europe can be 
connected with a temporality nowadays uncommon. The process of nationalization, as Nora or Renan 
convey it, had a lot to do with a radical change of temporality, an understanding of time in general18. 
Current secondary memory is based exclusively on mundane and linear perception of time, while 
history is in a sense a-historical (in a sense a-temporal) calendar, an archive, within which we can add 
data without changing the structure itself. 
So to speak about the modern era and leave the pre-national period apart for a moment, Jean-Paul 
Sartre deals with a connected problem. He can either (1a) live, oriented always only on the present 
moment, and therefore necessarily (1b) leave behind himself only unclassified data of the same 
significance (cp. Sartre 1967: 56) or (2) narrate a coherent and linear chosen memories-line from the 
past to the future and live within his own narration. From his agony we get three different structures. 
Firstly, always enduring and perceiving subject (exactly what Bergson conceptualize with 
consciousness in time-duration, always present), secondly a set of impersonal data archive of 
somebody´s actions ordered as consistent with the system of 24 hours per day and 365 days per year 
(as always a-temporal spatial past), and finally a story of somebody ordered after his own ascription 
of meaning to reified memories that embrace both his memory and present experience with himself (as 
past present).    
In the second chapter, however interconnected, we focused on the process in which actions obtain 
meaning and intelligibility and are linearly connected through to each other, and we found this process 
to order events after the manner of narration. We related this narrative identity both to an agent an 
individual and a society as a unity, and identified it also as a mean of individual identification with a 
group.  
Unlike both enduring always forgetting subject and everything storing historical archive, narrative 
rules the temporality after its own logic. It can be (both in cases of society or individual) firstly centred 
on different temporal and causal horizons, secondly centred on events or epochs and thirdly on single 
representatives or society at large. The core of the narrative temporality can be in the past, in the future 
or outside the world-time. Now we should give a heed to those three temporalities from the 
perspective of encompassing political narratives.  
3.1. Eternity centred temporality 
However unfair or dangerous we might it perceive, history as we know it is written as consistent with 
an idea of national community (and if not, there is always highlighted the trans-national character of 
                                                          
18 The reason why Jewish nation had not undergone the process and why can Nora trace their „world“ as a 
milieux, lies in the transcendent character of conveying time and religious identity as I will argue later. 
the story – such as in the Marxist history of labour relations or the feminist “Women's history” 
approach – and the national history as the primary unit is thus respected). One could argue, that 
nationalism of modern forma has occurred in the modern time, while historiography we can trace to a 
far antiquity. That is surely a sound argument, which makes me accentuate that history is now in the 
centre of our interest inasmuch as it affect broad masses of people. Although mythology of 
foundational character might be important for citizens of ancient civilizations, historiography is the 
sense of Thucydides was not of big influence. Narrative relating to a broad mass is not intrinsic to 
modern age, though. So called historia salutis, the Salvation history, concerning not purely mundane 
story of Christianity, was not only related to many people, but aspire on universal character. And in a 
case of Europe, for a few centuries Christian narrative actually become the last all-embracing ruler of 
the logic of political temporality.  
According to this narrative, the whole humankind is defiled with the original sin and since then people 
are imprisoned in linear time. The period until Jesus Christ, i.e. the age of the Old Testament can be 
defined as following: despite of the original sin God aims all people to be redeemed and due to this 
purpose he intervenes in the world (remember the myth of flood and Noah, of Ten Commandments 
and Moses etc.). His last intervention is the most important. He sends his own son that redeems every 
single person through his sacrifice. The Salvation history from this turning point teleologically 
continues with chapters of the first Church, first missions and finally the Christian identity of 
Europe19.  
For few centuries, this religious “history” used to be a master-narrative of the European people. Being 
baptized, people have been born for a different world with a different “end” of their lives. Being 
married, they have been joined forever because of the different logic of time, no matter what happens 
(to secularize the temporality of marriage with the consequence of civic divorce took more than two 
centuries after all). In so perceived history, every moment and event was connected with “always 
Now” eternity of the Transcendence and only with this connection can history be history, since 
without it would be but mere physical process (Pospíšil 2009: Chap.5). The Church via this 
temporality ruled social hierarchy, art, education, law, politics and the mundane time itself: 
“Societies from the period before the French Revolution, we called sacred, were not defined 
only by coupling of power with the Church, but to the same extent also by pervasions of 
religion into society itself. And those pervasions were confirmed by steady and omnipresent 
presence of religion in collectively driven life. Mundane time flew in accordance with a cycle 
of religious feasts; regarding time to be for work and amusement or feasts promoting social 
life, everything was bound with the liturgical calendar.” (Remond 2003: 234)  
Only in time within which a life-time of an individual or even a whole society is marginal, since what 
matters is the future redemption, milieux de memoire could have occurred. Personal narratives were 
connected with the narrative from outside of the world and as such, the real heroes could have been 
only those, who forgot the world as much as possible and do not perceive their own narrative as 
                                                          
19 While the umbrella narrative of salvation has faded in Europe with Renaissance, in the East the narrative has 
been only transformed and we can trace the myth of Istanbul as the Second Rome and then especially the 
myth of Moscow as the Third Rome, the last heir of the true faith so to speak about the mundane part of the 
narrative, until late modernity.   
important at all: saints20. Nora´s second example, Jews, follow the logic of the same temporality of 
eternity.  
Other typical examples, to put it differently, of milieux de memoire could be native inhabitants of 
Easter Island before colonization, the world of Greeks before Socrates and so forth. Always societies 
for whose life of an individual, ethic, natural science and politics were essentially intermingled with 
cosmology21.  
It seems odd from a current perspective. But on the same basis actually make sense a manifesto of 
Alexander Dugin, old only few years: 
„Conservative revolutioners want not only to slow down the time (like liberal conservatives) 
or to go back to the past (like traditionalists) but to pull out the root of evil from the world 
structure, to abolish the time as a destructive characteristic of reality by fulfilling some secret, 
parallel, not obvious plan of the Deity.“ (Dugin 2012: 133) 
However, having been step by step replaced by secular ideas the Renaissance and ensuing 
Enlightenment and especially by a civic state, it have finally welded into either national or liberal 
narratives with their own temporalities. I will classify those two types of secular22 political temporality 
ruling meta-narratives23 as linearly oriented towards (1) the past and (2) the future. We will see it is 
not only focusing on the past or the future but it is different times as temporalities per se what is at 
stake. Elaborating on so called politics of memory (as the extreme case of one orientation) we will 
obviously pay more attention to the first type.  
3.2. Past centred national narratives 
Firstly, as Benedict Anderson argues, the known world was finally divided to several contested 
narratives of exclusive character (Anderson 1991). Particular secular historical story of one nation 
might be the opposite of another – to win a war is in another narrative taken as a defeat24. Concerning 
the past, or more precisely, the past that already nobody directly remember (as what happened during 
seventeenth century), people extend their story to common past of the nation. If one should describe 
his “origin” (definitively the leading topoi of those narratives), unless being emigrant of first few 
generations, he will narrate the story of his nation. National narrative is strong through shared 
symbolical grammar, taught history, common rituals and so on; a narrative of profession (as history of 
medicine), of gender (as history of women) or a hobby (as history of football or sport in general) 
                                                          
20 A similar pattern of the power of this „political“ temporality notices Foucault, analyzing the absence of 
individual authorship in the Middle age (cp. Foucault: What is an author?)   
21 The reason, maybe, why Christian peasants and Jews are for Nora more significant than other milieu, is 
because of their linear temporality, however essentially joined with the notion of time-eternity. Greeks on the 
other side perceived time cyclically, what together with their faith in fate precluded linear history in the sense 
as we use it. (cp. Pospíšil 2009) 
22 We will probably later see, that national politics based on other than liberal temporality of progress are more 
than often influenced by religion and their theorists often involve supra-mundane time as a part of the 
argumentation.  
23 I use the term „meta-narrative“ as a synonym to „grand-narrative“ or „master-narrative“ 
24 It is important to accentuate this moment, since it is a salient argument of conservative Poles for their 
normative memory politics: “Society without its own history politics becomes an object of history politics of 
others.” (Król 2015) In a similar manner made a speech the sitting president Andrzej Duda: “ʻEurope is and will 
be the Europe of nations. I am sure that Germans, French, British, Italiens and Greeks for sure won´t allow to 
themselves to give up their fatherlandsʼ he said accentuating that politics of history is the main tool to build the 
nation.” (Oficjalna strona Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: 2015)    
cannot now achieve the national level of identification. History of medicine is hardly considered as “a 
story of somebody´s origin”.  
In Introduction to his well-known book Anderson shows what a paradoxical nature national 
consciousness is of. As one pattern that captivates him might be considered the discrepancy between 
the enthusiasm from below and the bureaucratic manipulative intention from above. He wonders how 
ruling dynasties, the most a-national entity spread all over Europe, have become a symbol of a nation 
and succeeded in integrating their identity of aristocratic genealogy with the national identity of the 
people of a particular land. Observed from the imagery of “political narratology”, one could say that 
they have succeeded in incorporating their “characters” into the narrative of a political unity. The 
temporality of aristocracy, ruled by perfectly mapped ancestors, became accrual with the social 
identity perceived as lying in the historical narrative semantically anchored in a topoi of origin. 
History interpreted in their favour played a significant role here, especially because of the invention of 
compulsory education. Qua shared past25 and therefore shared fate people of the nation become an 
imagined community, as he put it. Community, whose members do not know each other personally 
and in spite of it consider each other as belonged. We can also find this past-narrative pattern in 
another theorist of nationalism, Ernest Renan: 
„[...] the essence of a nation is that all of its individual members have a great deal in common 
and also that they have forgotten many things.“ (Renan 1992: 4) 
French people had used to be, he says, divided into noblemen and peasants. Only after they have 
forgotten those milieux de memoire, as Nora would say, something as French nation could have 
occurred. And after all, it now does make sense to speak about certain actions of a person or a group in 
national categories and their deeds can be seen as next chapters of cumulative national heritage.  
It is only natural from this perspective that one of the first tasks of modern civic state was to destroy 
the Church´s monopoly on time: 
“It has been surely already out of question to replace the liturgical calendar by a profane 
calendar as during the French Revolution, but by installing national feasts of purely mundane 
character churches lost the monopoly on time and its division between work and amusement.” 
(Remond 2003: 170) 
Not only were national bank holidays ordered after the manner of events (i.e. major collisions and 
disentanglements of the designated history of nation), but the important feature of the threshold is also 
impossibility of introducing the same, although profane, calendar. The national narrative was not to be 
permanently recycled as the liturgical one. Since the temporality of the political narration was unlike, 
time could not be ordered and perceived in the same way.  
3.3. Future centred narratives of ideologies 
Secondly, temporality of politics could become oriented towards a mundane future (as opposing the 
temporality of “politics” driven to future redemption as in the Middle age or for instance Armageddon 
as in a case of some fundamentalists lately). The most typically it is a feature of political philosophy 
during and after Enlightenment. Society is (and should be) in this discourse evolving towards the 
better future. Meta-stories narrated by modern liberals and later by modernization theorists are of 
remarkably different nature than those narrated by intellectuals formulating national identities. Liberal 
                                                          
25 I do not intend to scrutinize Anderson narrowly, but is fair enough to add that in his thought the reason is 
primary the vernacular and not common history. 
progressivism is a narrative with a focal point in variously distant future. The temporality is here of 
completely opposite direction that the temporality of national stories of origin and inherited identity of 
society.  
Typical example of this narrative would be the first epoch of the United States. What did matter was 
not where the segments of societies were from, who their antecedents were and what story can they 
tell about themselves – pivotal for their new  identity was reversely the future of their common “New 
world” as we can exemplarily observe in the movie-patchwork The Birth of Nation.  Another example, 
rather paradoxical, could be the dream of the International Workingmen´s Association, known today 
under the name First International. The past in those two examples is in no case not forgotten. 
Especially in the Marxist argumentation is the theory of past development extremely important (but 
let´s just only paradigmatically mention how pitiful status received the past in Fučík´s dictum “where 
tomorrow means yesterday26”). But the rationale of these visions lies in the future27. Society is here 
perceived (or should) as an (the) unity qua shared future and enduring combat for it. 
3.4. The end of history 
To speak about temporalities of political narratives, we cannot omit a concept of the end of history. 
The article of Francis Fukuyama, The end of history, from 1989 together with the ensuing book The 
end of history and the last man from 1992 have become controversial for its strong thesis that history 
is definitively over, since the progressive spread of liberal democracy is inevitable and the only 
possible end of the human story. Using Hegel´s terminology Fukuyama argues that although it (1) still 
can take time to achieve the definitive state of liberal democracies all over the globe and (2) technical 
aspects of it could vary and change, the final triumph of fundamental principles and values of liberal 
democracy has begun yet. Beside the liberal economic argument akin to Kant´s theory of 
liberalization, he uses the Hegelian reasoning.   
3.4.1. Struggle for recognition 
Every person takes part in what Hegel calls struggle for recognition – and then in the famed master-
slave dialectic. This cryptic terminology means only that people want to be recognized as people – and 
what after all renders them to be humans is ability to subjugate even fear of death to follow another 
purpose; i.e. to govern themselves even behind this bound. In famous death struggle, where two 
people stand face to face in life and death fight, one of them finally succumbs and chooses to be rather 
enslaved than dead, while the second endures, does not falter and chooses rather to be dead than a 
slave. This struggle divides these two in two groups: that of masters and that of slaves. This Hegel´s 
figure does not really imply some never ending state of war. It should be read, and mostly has been 
read and interpreted by scholars as a general schema of human interaction and human history on social 
level and of human consciousness on individual level.   
To describe this struggle and inherent division into governing and governed from an inner view, 
Fukuyama borrows Plato´s term of thymos. Thymos, shortly speaking, originally describe spiritedness, 
                                                          
26 However disputable is to use Julius Fučík´s to illustrate temporal orientation of the First International, I 
believe it works here as representing the Marxist topoi of always exceeded yesterdays. 
27 Very interesting would certainly be to plunge here into the case of Masaryk´s thoughts after the First World 
War. His case makes obvious it is never black and white „either-or“ narrative and we can in almost every case 
trace strong patterns of both orientations. The reason why I dare to classify certain politics with certain 
temporal orientations and temporalities is semantically founded – I believe the web of topoi that actually 
differs them so radically can show us something important. I also do not claim what I call “politics” is perfectly 
internally coherent and united. What on personal level perfectly depicts the crush of those two distinct 
narrative orientations is a French movie Le Nom des gens (Leclerc, 2010). 
the part of human nature that is responsible for passion and emotional life of a person – Plato in 
dialogue Phaedrus distinguishes it from intellectual virtue of human soul (so called nous) and from 
vegetative physical virtue (so called appetite). Fukuyama´s reading of this dialogue understand thymos   
“[...] like an innate human sense of justice. People believe that they have a certain worth, and 
when other people treat them as though they are worth less than that, they experience the 
emotion of anger. Conversely, when people fail to live up to their own sense of worth, they 
feel shame, and when they are evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth, they feel pride. 
The desire for recognition, and the accompanying emotions of anger, shame, and pride, are 
parts of the human personality critical to political life” (Fukuyama 1992: xvii) 
This part of human nature – so to highlight it, not the intellectual one nor the desiring one – is 
responsible for historical political evolution and for social struggles. Neither economic interests nor 
rational contemplation and theory of game based decisions could be the fundamental principle of 
political life. The question of to what extent is Fukuyama plausible with Plato´s original meaning of 
the term or to what extent is political life in fact driven by material interests of people (as Marx puts it) 
is not for now very important. Fukuyama´s theory is based on the Hegelian struggle for recognition 
and understanding of this struggle as a matter of emotion, i.e. individual subjective feelings, faiths and 
worldviews. His use of thymos is cognate to Hegel´s passion, responsible for dialectical process of 
history: “[…] to explain History is to depict the passions of mankind, the genius, the active powers, 
that play their part on the great stage.28” (Hegel 1837: §17) 
3.4.2. Megalothymia and Isothymia 
Fukuyama uses the possible division into two understandings of what this human desire (or, if you 
wish, this human passion) for being recognized as what one perceive himself: megalothymia and 
isothymia. Megalothymia consists, shortly, in desire to be seen as better, to be recognized as a master 
over others, while isothymia aims universal recognition of equals, where everyone is recognized 
equally. In political terms, the ideal of isothymia is democracy – where everyone is equally 
recognized. One of possible political forms of megalothymia, on the other hand, was aristocracy. An 
aristocratic man perceived himself as better than his dependants – whatever the scale of recognition 
was: social prestige, moral and intellectual qualities, proximity to God in Church hierarchy, ability to 
govern oneself, etc. The megalothymia was not necessarily a matter of individual person; it seems 
likely that it was much more a matter of house and name.  
After the gradual defeat of feudalism as prevalent form of political life and state of mind, 
megalothymia has occurred in different version – in modern nationalism (and recently, fundamental 
Islamism), where the megalothymic struggle has been shifted to collective level of identity. 
Nationalists have struggling for being recognized as part of an exclusive group, a nation – in 
Fukuyama´s thought, nationality is not an intrinsic and natural feature of human self, since people are 
of a certain nationality only if they are recognized as such. In the world without (recognized) nations 
there would be no nationalities. And as such, he argue, that the struggle on the field of nationalities is 
essentially irrational, essentially thymotic. It implies the strong condition of possibility of being 
recognized as- before struggling for it. Or in other words, it implies that the field of the struggle has to 
be already marked to struggle in political imagery, and possible fields of political struggle change and 
vary. From Fukuyama´s viewpoint thus today (or more precisely, with lenses of today imagery) 
                                                          
28 The use of a theatrical metaphor is here only expressive. This history-drama analogy is popular among many 
memory-studies scholars together with the narrative and spectacular essence of it (cp. Činátl 2014:16). 
megalothymiacs look only as extreme individuals – the historical evolution as the political battlefield 
is defined in liberal figures since the end of history and megalothymia of political realm is over:  
“The desire for glory that for Machiavelli was so normal a part of the human makeup-that 
inordinate striving to be better than others, to make as many people as possible recognize one's 
superiority-is no longer an acceptable way to describe one's personal goals. It is in fact a 
characteristic we attribute to people that we don't like, those tyrants who have arisen among us 
like Hitler, Stalin, or Saddam Hussein.” (Fukuyama 1992: 190) 
The sphere of politics is driven by thymos still – but by the rational form of it, i.e. by isothymia, the 
only acceptable in a sense of sustainable one.  It is not an accident that he illustrates his condemnation 
of political megalothymia with Hitler, Stalin and Saddam Hussein – symbols of the most radical 
master-narratives of nationalism, communism and anti-colonial and anti-western movements (although 
he could probably find better and more clear character than this Iraq dictator).  
3.5. Grand narratives of historical people and the end of history 
To a great extent we could identify Fukuyama´s thymos as a virtue of human soul with a need of a 
narrative for human identity. Thymos is responsible for struggle for being recognized as-; thymos is 
the passion, the engine of the narrative. What matters is the field of the struggle, the ideal character of 
a person (or a group) that he is struggling to be recognized as. This is what makes the narrative 
schema, narrative boundaries. Narrative schema of historical people and historical struggles is of 
different nature than that of post-historical individual identities and “life-styles”. 
Fukuyama contra intuitively agree with Nietzsche upon the definition of nation as of subpolitical, ergo 
moral and cultural entity, while state stands only as a “cold” (as Nietzsche puts it), neutral machinery 
– the most anti-thymotic political “agent”. For Nietzsche it is an argument to defy state and to cry for 
strong men and nations, for Fukuyama it is only the last possible stage of evolution, the end of history. 
People after modern period (in which universal vote right was to be recognized and by means of it 
people have become equally recognized as citizens) only need to put up with possible megalothymic 
tendencies, and to accept and recognize others as the same in the eyes of state and law. Megalothymia 
is natural, admits Fukuyama, and in democratic state is to be streamlined to safe individual “mega-
stories” – on economic (he names here Henry Ford or Ted Turner) or scientific field: 
„The striving to be recognized as superior has not disappeared from human life, but its 
manifestations and extent have changed. Rather than seeking recognition for having 
conquered foreign peoples and lands, megalothymotic individuals try to conquer Annapurna, 
or AIDS, or the technology of X-ray lithography.“ (Fukuyama 1992: 320) 
In short, Fukuyama´s post-historical people are those of only individual life-stories, while historical 
people are those of shared grand-narratives. It does not matter, whether we speak about grand-
narratives of medieval crusades (and that of Salvation history), of enlightenment and liberalism (and 
that of emancipation of man and of enduring progress), of nationalism (and that of national myths), of 
twentieth century ideologies or after all of anticommunist dissidents´ combats for democracy. 
Historical people perceive themselves in a meta-story where they play part and through which they 
create meanings and thus can orient themselves in the world.  
The topoi of the human story in “history” in Fukuyama´s sense has to be mythic and historical (still 
dialectical, pursuing “the other”, as contrary to post-historical topoi of only better and broader “the 
same”), since the battlefield is of mythic irrational nature – the nationalist struggle is probably the best 
example. Participating in those narratives turns, as Hegel noted, people´s life into something bigger, in 
different character – they are veterans, revolutionists, conspirators etc. in supra-individual story: 
„vzpomínkou na to, čím prošli, tedy na něco, co je větší než oni, se životy vojáků mění v cosi většího.“ 
(Fukuyama 1992; cp. Witeska-Młynarczyk 2014: 158) With the most obvious example at all – that of 
the Lost Generation – Fukuyama admits people´s need of grandiose narrative and simultaneously the 
narrative shortage in stable liberal democracy. Instead of historical meta-narratives, he puts forward 
above mentioned one-life narratives. And here comes the Achilles´ heel: 
“Experience suggests that if men cannot struggle on behalf of a just cause because that just 
cause was victorious in an earlier generation, then they will struggle against the just cause. 
They will struggle for the sake of struggle. They will struggle, in other words, out of a certain 
boredom: for they cannot imagine living in a world without struggle.” (Fukuyama 1992: 330) 
In other words, men long for meta-narratives of historical time, with epic complications and where 
single episodes are together of big significance in consequences. His consideration is here congruent 
with that of previous chapters of this text: narrative creates meaning. The environment of liberal 
democracy is that of procedural equality of individual narratives and life-styles but without any 
umbrella narrative (since the democracy is already prevailed and established and since the combat for 
it is a story of “fathers”). The most salient problem of democracy in this theory is an absence of supra-
individual story: 
“Such a psychology could be seen at work behind outbreaks like the French evenements of 1 
968. Those students who temporarily took over Paris and brought down General de Gaulle had 
no "rational" reason to rebel, for they were for the most part pampered offspring of one of the 
freest and most prosperous societies on earth. But it was precisely the absence of struggle and 
sacrifice in their middle-class lives that led them to take to the streets and confront the police.” 
(Fukuyama 1992: 330) 
Basically the same shows Jean-Luc Godard in La Chinoise from 1967. The satirical movie depicts a 
group of “wannabe” maoistic revolutionaries, wealthy students living in parents´ apartments and doing 
more or less nothing but obsessively reading and debating Marxist texts they do not understand and 
using the terminology in every conceivable situation of everyday life. So called “Dialogue: 
Veronique” perfectly suits here:   
“Why did I find marxism? Nanterre seemed boring firstly, as it is surrounded by slums, but 
after that I have step by step found the philosophy for workmen´s suburb. [...] Seriously, If I 
had been courageous, I would have blow up Sorbonne, Louvre and Comedie Francais. Really, 
revolution is no soirée [...], revolution is violent uprising when one class overthrow the other. I 
am in the philosophic class.” (Jean-Luc Godard 1967: 22´-23´40´´) 
She uses Marxism not as a mere hobby in the sense that she could perhaps as well as Marxist 
enthusiast be a philatelist or a kick boxer, it is not primarily – although she explicitly says it – a 
medicament against boredom. It is more. With falling into Marxism she has became a different 
character, because of the different story. The sphere of possible of an ordinary poor girl from suburb 
would never be so exciting (in a sense “worth of living”), since dreaming of being a terrorist would 
not make any sense at all. Her story would be that of necessary work and marriage maybe, of private 
hobbies and little life, while here she lives a common story together – in a metaphorical book – with 
Che Guevara and Mao. She is not a character of an average girl student in 20th century Paris, but of a 
part of philosophical class combating for better life of millions – and this story creates a web of 
meanings in the world; she would be lost, bored and boring without. 
What differentiates historical and post-historical people with their narratives is not only the breadth of 
the meta-story, but also its temporal horizon. After focusing on the political narratives oriented toward 
the past, the future or supra-mundane eternity, we should add one more political temporality – that of 

























4. Politics of memory as an extreme case of political temporality 
In general, the concept of politics of memory or politics of history usually conveys two meanings.  
Firstly it stands sharply against the end of history. This type aims to rehabilitate the grand-narrative 
and to place current society in the story as direct heirs of new chapters. The grand-narratives are of 
monumental history (cp. Nietzsche 1992), of paradigmatic heroes and combats for identity. As such, 
the enemy could be exactly the end of history, the liberal postmodernism and “heritage-consumerism”. 
(cp. Connerton 2009) Those narratives are almost exclusively of national character, and broadly 
alleged to be dangerous, nationalistic and often even fascist (cp. Eco 1995). The temporality of this 
politics is strongly oriented toward the past, the national past.  
Secondly it could stand for society's willingness to reconcile its members and deal with the divisive 
past. This basically, to use our previous enquiry, is the last step / first step of the society having passed 
the end of history. This type of politics of memory endeavours to shed a light on past events and 
petrify the past once the society has dealt with it, so that it would be but a mere interesting story 
behind the democracy of political nation. After this reconciliation process, history is to be in a sense a 
folklore of no political influence – although every society would have its own story, as well its own 
“national heritage” of architecture landmarks, national parks and cuisine. This politics is deemed to be 
healing and providing the global society with historical examples that should give “us” a lesson and 
warn against analogical perils. The stance of proponents of this approach is said to be post-liberal as 
the grand-narratives are over after the end of history. This kind of politics should as such be of 
completely opposite temporality than that of based on the heroic past bypassing the end of history 
condemned as illusory and instrumental. We will see on examples of Polish memory politics, 
representing the extreme politics of the past (or at least it is deemed so), and its liberal critique from 
the viewpoint of chiliastic temporality, what a paradox can occur. A status of post-historical discourses 
towards so called “politics of memory” in the liberal and trauma healing or moral examples providing 
sense is very ambiguous. Yet, first of all we should pay more attention to this tentative division in 
Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet bloc.   
 
4.1. Eyal: Two forms of the Will to Memory 
„Here [in Eastern Europe] there is too much memory, too much pasts on which people can 
draw, usually as a weapon against the past of someone else. [...] For eastern Europeans the 
past is not just another country but a positive archipelago of vulnerable historical territories, to 
be preserved from attacks and distortions perpetrated by the occupants of a neighbouring 
island of memory...“ (Judt 1992: 172) 
Tony Judt here represents the broadly accepted view that Central and Eastern Europe is obsessed with 
its own past. The general academic consensus expressed in this snippet is usually rooted either in fact 
of many modern reference points in national histories that are still present in contesting narrative lines 
of the area or the long suppression of other but the communist narrative. So to speak about the 
political dimension, according to Astrid Erll there are several causes of what she calls the “memory 
boom”: the death of the Shoah generation, the end of the Cold war (and both a rise of national 
narratives in countries of former Soviet bloc and their democratic transition via truth and 
reconciliation scheme) and finally decolonization in general. (Erll 2011) All over the world we can 
now watch the influence of narratives that was generally named as “memory from bellow”, “contra 
memory” and “victim memory” – Pierre Nora himself speaks about “tyrannie de memoire” since 
history is written from the perspective of white men. The alleged Central and Eastern Europe´s 
occupation is a in a sense featured by all of the causes above mentioned.  
American sociologist Gil Eyal argues that what might seem as typically eastern European obsession is 
nothing else that a specific “will to memory” – a political tool strongly present in two different forms, 
serving two different aims. In his article Identity and Trauma: Two Forms of the Will to Memory he 
introduces a theory of two types of politics of memory as anticipated before. 
4.2. Identity narrative 
“In one version, memory is the guarantor of identity and maintains it through time [...], generates the 
sense of an embattled memory, attacked and challenged from the outside by competing versions of the 
past.” (Eyal 2004: 7) According to him, this version is essentially religious so to speak about 
temporality, and the historical facts are not important in the sense of “events” as he shows with the 
example of Jews: “each generation should consider themselves as if they themselves were rescued 
from Egypt. In a certain limited sense the exodus from Egypt is mentioned here as an “event” to be 
remembered, but as a historical event, with all its details, it is completely uninteresting from the point 
of view of the ritual [...], i.e. not to remember an event but to place themselves, once again, within that 
invisible history, and in a sense re-enact it.” (Eyal 2004: 10) and therefore, “what is counted were not 
events, but the constants of history – labour, territory, language and consciousness. Together they 
comprised the continuity of national existence.” (Eyal 2004: 15) The history is “a narrative about the 
formation, continuity and final identity of the nation.” (Eyal 2004: 13)  
It could sound perhaps natural and present in every national politics. But current politicians use the 
past as a legitimization of the present much less than one would expected, and rather replace the past 
by the future (Anderson 1991; Connerton 2009; Nora 1989). This turn took place in the first instance 
with the idea of never ending progress as understood at the turn of 19th and 20th century. Politicians are 
usually elected not because their characters and thoughts that symbolizes cohere to a great extent with 
the visions of citizens; politicians have become a neutral and rather previously anonymous figures 
elected on the basis of particular promises. Narratives of current modern state usually treat history 
with distance and as a science, and concerns of memory as a private affair. History is commemorated 
via separate lieux de memoire, as introduced hereinbefore, as a particular sparks from the past that 
permeate the present only when somebody gives them directly attention. This “sites of memory” are 
present as ordinary parts of our world, such as we can every day pass a war monument or be grateful 
for a free day because of a the independence day, but as sites of memory – sites, in which the past is of 
the highest relevance concerning the present, such as during patriotic masses or anniversary 
commemoration of a past event are speeches usually oriented on present and future matters but from 
the perspective of the commemorated past event.  
4.3. Trauma narrative 
In the second attitude then, memory “plays a role in overcoming psychic trauma and the process of 
dissociation set in motion,” (Eyal 2004: 7) and the role is namely to “cure society and protect it from 
itself from its tendency to repeat abnormal and dangerous patterns of behaviour.” (Eyal 2004: 12) 
Since samizdat writings, “memory emerged as moral duty, as historical responsibility, because power 
benefited from forgetting.” (Eyal 2004: 20) Only with admitting the past without ideological lenses 
and following denial of certain actions the society will successfully transform into a “normal” and 
“working” democracy after the end of history.  
Unlike many, Eyal directly connect these two forms with particular memory cultures, namely Czech 
and Slovakian. Dichotomy where both sides are intertwined and interrelated is however rather 
common in every corner of memory studies. Eyal´s two “wills” are more that connected to what 
Tzvetan Todorov distinguishes as “literal memory” versus “exemplar memory”. The first subdues the 
present to the past, as the memory is the only arbiter of a concrete and unchallenged memories from 
the inner perspective, while the other allows us to actualize the sense and as such is analogue to 
“justice”, as he puts it.  
Stating that “In our memory we have to keep memories alive: not to claim damages, but to be alert 
face to face to situations which are new, but anyway analogical,” (Todorov 1998: 116) he is very close 
to the trauma-healing approach in Eyal´s writings.  
 
4.4. Maslowski´s hermeneutics 
Focusing on this area, another important distinction for us could be that of Nicholas Maslowski. He 
separate the dimension of state control above the final form of collective memory on the one side 
(politics of memory as a technique of control) and eluding collective memory with a moral imperative 
to remember on the other (politics of memory as a hermeneutical task). On the first level is historical 
narrative of nations a pragmatic action run by the state to unite and in a sense homogenize citizens qua 
shared story and symbols that legitimize the state in a current shape and regime. The second level is 
strongly linked to holocaust studies. By remembering six million of dead Jews, collective memory acts 
as a guardian of values of human right, equality and freedom. (Maslowski 2013: 282) In his article the 
subject of elaboration is not two separate politics but rather layers of a single memory discourse in one 
political culture.    
With those divisions, that of memory as a identity guarantee or trauma healer, that of Todorov´s two 
types of memory and finally that of Maslowski´s dimensions of politics of memory we can trace a 
similar pattern. All of them are from different positions trying to convey all at once two axes. 
Intuitively we feel that hermeneutical politics of memory is close to liberal trauma healing approach 
and the “exemplar memory”, while techniques of control over memory are related with “literal 
memory” and national identity. Also we somehow feel that the first one is for everybody (as witnesses, 
victims and heroes represents their cases as examples that we can teach from, admire, regret as people 
regardless the nationality, religion, occupation, political affiliation, gender or age), while the other 
makes particular examples of memorized objects closer and more intimate to “belonged”, in this case 
through the same nationality. But this first sight is too shallow. Both kinds of memory politics 







5. Polish conservative discourse : polityka pamięnci 
With our theoretical background, we may concentrate now on a case study. Polish conservatives have 
been developing and establishing politics of memory which is considered to be of strongly 
nationalistic and perilous form. This discourse is anyway by no means something new in Poland, 
which is probably one of reasons why it is so powerful. We should try to trace its argumentation and 
connect it to a proper intellectual tradition. It is rather symptomatic that its proponents speak about 
social realities in national all embracing categories and the subject of their narrative are Poles as united 
entity. In this sense their argumentation is remarkably essentialist29.   
5.1.  History in “the history of Poles” 
„The Poles are passionately involved in their history. For a nation which during the last two 
centuries has desperately struggled not only for independence but for its very survival as a 
separate entity, this is only natural. The Poles search history for the errors which brought their  
defeats and miseries; and even more often, they turn to the past glory of their state for 
encouragement and inspiration in their repeated efforts to regain their freedom, and they 
revere their predecessors who – even if vanished – have fallen in the battle.“ (Bromke 1987:1)  
With this paragraph Adam Bromke opens the edition of classic texts of Polish political thought !!!!!! 
and continues: “this in itself provided [historians´] work with political connotations, but they did not 
stop there, and went blond just searching for truth.” History was, he says, always in the service of 
politics. National consciousness of Poles is here said to be strongly embedded in their sense for 
romantic grand narrative of themselves. Political thought in Poland, from historical reason setting 
foreign issues over interior politics, always oscillates between realism and idealism. The difference 
can be clarified by an analogy with pragmatism and romanticism of the 19th and 20th centuries, 
between so called organic work and open struggle for independence. Traditions of political thought are 
by this “Primat der Aussenpolitik” centred on the question of survival of a society as the society. To 
issue painful history as a constitutive pattern is in Polish case only innate, he concludes.  
Together with strong tradition of Catholic Church in Poland, Polish conservatives lay national 
martyrology in the very core of Polish consciousness.  
“Narratives of national martyrdom, expressed in the idiom of Romantic idealism, offered a 
means of making sense of these events. The idea of Poland as the “Christ of Nations”, 
participating in the passion of Christ through suffering and carrying a mission to redeem 
humanity through suffering, became a key trope in Polish national imagination.” (Fedor 2015: 
246) 
 Here we can quote Renan again to clarify the argument for their orientation: 
“Having suffered, rejoiced, and hoped together is worth more than common taxes or frontiers 
that conform to strategic ideas and is independent of racial or linguistic 
considerations.“Suffered together”, I said, for shared suffering unites more than joy. In fact, 
periods of mourning are worth more to national memory than triumphs because they impose 
duties and require a common effort.“ (Renan 1992: 10) 
Now it seems that after the end of the Cold War, independent and democratic Poland will reorient 
itself towards the future (and we will see that one part of the political spectre has been trying to do it). 
                                                          
29 Working with original texts crucial for this discourse, we should bracket concepts as „Poles“ or „Polish“ as 
conveying archetypes of „an essential Pole“ and „essentially Polish“ exclusively in their view.    
On the other hand, the role of heroic history has not faded with the independence of 1918. Bromke on 
this cites K. E. Valkenier:  
“the predillection of the Poles to manipulate their collective memory in order to rationalize the 
present according to some particular vision of history is a living legacy of their historical 
experience […] the past will continue to be highly charged issue as long as society remains to 
be dissatisfied with the present.” (Bromke 1987:103)  
To sum up, current politics of memory is rooted deep in the tradition of such essentialisticaly 
perceived national identity. The accent on historical narrative is on account of it present in everyday 
scenes. The discourse of polityka pamięnci is therefore not closed in paradigm of transition, even if we 
speak about the starting point of the perspective and legitimacy of this discourse currently. Its 
ambitions go further. 
5.2. Ethos and narrative of heroes 
Cultural memory of Poles is in this discourse also not as much concerned with history of data as with 
the ethos and schema of their national narrative30 – the narrative of heroism and resurrections, of 
betrayal and external danger from both outsized neighbours, of loss and suffering. (cp. Wolff-Powęska 
2006) Witeska-Młynarczyk adds:  
“The cultural form of memory emerges from the entanglement of actions taken up by these 
actors [institutionally allied politicians, bureaucrats and representatives of academia, people 
who are objects of polityka historyczna31 and society at large]. Yet, it is also historically and 
culturally conditioned as it is shaped by particular institutions that have their own language 
and traditions (such as the IPN32), and by well-established cultural tools – such as books, 
specific traditions of linguistic processing and metaphors.” (Witeska-Młynarczyk 2014:58)  
In a similar manner Bromke speaks about “Aesopian language” of Polish history science. According 
to him, Polish historians often use science as an instrument of showing young generation what is their 
origin and encourage them to oppose the foreign rule33. His observation of Polish society under 
communist regime strikingly corresponds with a recent ethnographic research of Witeska-
Młynarczyk34 as mentioned before. 
In his Diaries Gombrowicz treats this “normal Polish obsession with history” with open disrespect: 
“To free a Pole from Poland... so that a Pole would not passively conform to his Polishness, but took it 
less seriously instead, less strictly. What Poland is anyway, if we speak concretely? Ill past of the 
                                                          
30 This sounds only logical, for „the story“ is not over in their eyes, and they are part of it. To perceive it as an 
archive of data would in a sense mean to give up of the narrated past-present and reify past into a mere spatial 
structure. 
31 PiS uses terms of polityka historyczna (politics of history) and polityka pamięci (politics of memory) as 
synonyms. Unless quoting, I will use the term polityka pamięci. 
32 She refers to Institute of National Memory (Institut Pamęci Narodowej) that, has been established by Polish 
parliament in 1998, is among others responsible for lustration law and is highly controversial now.  
33 Bromke wrote this paper in late 80s, and described a situation under PRL (Polish People´s Republic; Polska 
Rzeczpospolita Ludowa). 
34 The correspondence here is asymmetrical. Adam Bromke is a historian in exile, writing from politically 
committed conservative position about “his dear fatherland” that has been occupied by foreign rule. Witeska-
Młynarczyk is a current scholar of Memory studies and she discursively maps former combatants and their 
“role-playing” of themselves. She does not speak about Poles at all; her studies show how powerful has 
become the politics of memory recently, that the conservative approach towards Polish history is broadly 
accepted in contemporary society.  
nation and its sustained withering...” (Gombrowicz 2001:11) Strong Polish memory is according to 
him caused by present frustration of Poles (or strictly speaking of Polish predecessors of current 
polityka pamięnci proponents). To provide his suspicion with evidence he brings up an episode from a 
soirée that took place in Polish institute Polonia in Paris:  
“It was worse than everything I used to hate in Poland... those krakowian houses, those 
Kościuszkos, those Copernicuses, the sentimentality, those idle talks...that awful 
demonstrations of our “culture merit” to Europe [...] everybody gave attention to the speaker, 
who praised the nation because it “engender Chopin”  and “we have Marie Curie-Sklodowska” 
and Wavel, and also Slowacki and Mickiewicz and apart from that we were the bulwark of 
Christianity and the constitution of May 3rd was very progressive...” (Gombrowicz 2001:83)  
By appraising great characters of Polish history they humiliate themselves, he continues. What is 
interesting in this snippet is that current argumentation for so called politics of memory looks at Polish 
history exactly reversely than Gombrowicz. Where he supports orientation toward future freed from 
painful past and simultaneously condemns boasting with admirable past, intellectuals connected to 
ruling Prawo i Sprawiedliwość35 (PiS), a party endorsing memory politics, talk about “liberal politics 
of shame” (polityka wstydu)36. (cp. Gawin 2010; Kaczyński 2016; Nowak 2016) 
The motive of frustration in a broader European community is anyway noticeable. The politics of 
memory is often juxtaposed to liberal “laissez-faire history” (Connerton 2009) set up by the first ruling 
elite – represented by thoughts of liberals such as Michnik, Miłosz or Lipski37. History of this liberal 
form38 caused, according to those who support the concept of politics of memory as introduced by PiS, 
the notion that Poland is on a lower evolutionary level than countries of Western Europe and only has 
to try to catch up with them (Wolff-Powęska 2006; Thompson 2010). Poland´s modern history is in 
this discourse perceived either as a mistake of Poles or a victim of foreign powers. The latter is more 
common and it shows that being a victim is (not) accepted as even more humiliating because it 
displays Poles as a mere passive toy in hands of those in power and downgrade them as helpless and 
subordinated.  
Norman Davies, one the most recognized figures regarding modern history of Poland, says it is 
impossible to understand a Polish politician´s thought and actions unless the archetypal role in 
accordance with tradition he ascribes to himself is taken in account39: 
“Such is the burden of History in Polish consciousness, that any full appreciation of the Polish 
crisis40 requires a full examination of the way in which the chief actors on the political scene 
                                                          
35 Law and Justice 
36 The motive of humiliation, of awkwardness, shame, degradation is noticeable as strongly emotionally 
influential topoi on both side of the disputation. 
37 This discourse is actually very close to a certain liberals in the Czech Republic. Symptomatically enough, both 
those liberal discourses spring from former dissident communities and main supporters from both countries 
often know each other.  
38 I do not intend to pay much attention to the liberal approach as lately represented by prof. Król for instance, 
because we will focus on the discourse´s argumentation in the following chapter. 
39 Davies in his book divides several traditions interlocking through the political history of Poland; according to 
him, political discourses vary by which tradition they choose, although all of them are oriented towards the 
national patriotism. 
40 He speaks about a crisis that took place within the Solidarity movement (Solidarność). I dare to use the 
analogy because the actors of the Solidarity crisis belonged to the same contradictory discourses as in late 
1990s. 
perceived their roles in relation to the nation´s traditions. Almost everyone in Poland lays 
claims to patriotism; so the fact that so many self-proclaimed patriots could disagree so 
profoundly with each other proves the existence not only of a large body of pseudo-patriotic 
impostors, but also to serious disparities in genuine patriot´s views of themselves and their 
opponents.” (Davies 2001: 351) 
For Polish political culture it is rather usual to use strong and often fixed tradition so that to show the 
story behind and to play a role of the successor of it; it is not only a matter of nationalism, though, and 
the liberal stance of temporality oriented towards the future perfectly allows that as well. We can quote 
a fragment from a speech of a conservative Jarosław Kaczyński from 10th June 2015, where he 
obviously draws analogy between his party (PiS) and Warsaw Uprising combatants: 
“Remember, the road is one. The one that led to the victory of May [194541] and that will also 
lead to the victory of October [201642] is the same road that leads to the truth and recovery of 
dignity that led us and that will lead us [...]” (Kaczyński 2015)  
5.3. Communitarianist rhetoric in politics of memory 
Dariusz Gawin, a director of Museum of Warsaw Rising (MPW43) and one of the leading intellectuals 
of the politics of memory, denies the identification of their purpose with that of Geschichtpolitik in 
post-nazi Germany. Their aims in the end refer to republican visions of true polis. He denunciates, 
referring to Dahrendorf´s theory of civic/civil societies, III. Rzeczpospolita44 (the current Polish state) 
as based exclusively on “cold principles”, i.e. on principles of progressive economy and living 
standard, strengthening Polish position in international terms and so forth. The same argumentation 
uses Paweł Ukielski, another leading figure of MPW: 
“In this period changes began also in Poland where people more often realised that was is 
impossible to build a conscious modern society without the unity of remembrance and that the 
“cold” plan of a community based only on economic ties was not functioning well.” (Ukielski 
2011) 
True compact society should rely on the principle of fatherland, belonging and fraternity (cp. Ruczaj 
2010). To enhance the true citizenship it is necessary to promote the past. (cp Duda´s speech from 
January 2016) In terms of previous chapters, we could say that polityka pamięci supporters try to make 
normatively accepted memory a crucial and constitutional element of Polish narrative. The 
communitarian rhetoric is in this approach to history more than obvious. Anna Wolff-Powęska quotes 
Dariusz Gawin and Paweł Kowal that supports this connection (the addressee of their speech is clearly 
the first post communist elite):  
„You have run away from history, we are triumphantly returning, you have chosen Europe, we 
[are choosing] nation and patriotism, you [have chosen] liberalism, and therefore consumerism 
and denial of values, we [are choosing] community.“45 (Wolff-Powęska 2006) 
                                                          
41 Clearly an allusion on Warsaw Uprising  
42 Parliamentary elections that took place in 25th October 2015  
43 Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego 
44 III. Republic 
45„Wy uciekliście od historii, my triumfalnie do niej wracamy, wy wybraliście Europę, my naród i patriotyzm, wy 
liberalizm, a co za tym idzie konsumpcjonizm i odrzucenie wartości, my wspólnotę!“ 
According to their politics of memory, the memory of citizens as of the united people of the nation lies 
in the very core of legitimacy of the state. Witeska-Młynarczyk, to mention her once more, argues 
that: “The heroes/victims, through the actions performed within the framework of the Association [of 
former combatants], simultaneously confer legitimacy on the post-communist state and derive 
recognition from it.” (Witeska-Młynarczyk 2014:79) For the current raison d’état the narrative motives 
of heroic resistance and dissent with the communist regime as a succession of the heroic resistance and 
dissent against Nazis and earlier resurrections and pragmatic “organic work against“ (sustaining of 
little acts of disobedience and positive promoting of Polish patriotism) under partitions are important. 
Conceived as these successors, the combatants finally won and overturned the vicious regime. From 
the narrative national perspective is the establishment of III. Rzeczpospolitej (III. RP) excellently 
coherent with the story narrated. But in their eyes, the republic has gone awry then. The most salient 
argument for their ambition to designate new regime of IV. RP and for their denial of the third lies in 
the belief that once the governing elite let the ethos of the society, the real patriotism emanating from 
the past, fade away, the society will disintegrate from within lacking the feeling of a common origin 
and a common fate. (Żaryn 2015) The ordinary explanation is always connected with the clash of 
temporalities. While liberal elites have chosen orientation towards the future and individualized future 
after the end of history46, PiS conservatives promote the politics of memory.  
5.4. The Museum of Warsaw Rising 
The recent opinion polls have shown that the overwhelming majority of people is strongly identified 
with the combatants of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944 (Elżbieta Wiącek 2013). This insurrectionist 
myth is, altogether with that of anti-communist heroes present in individual memories of people – not 
as a historical issue but as a part of the present state of affairs. The establishment of the Warsaw 
Rising Museum in its form is of such an importance because it coincides with the atmosphere of 
political beliefs of many Poles. And it perfectly fits to the narrative that both legitimize the post-
communist state and overrun the first version of it. Not surprisingly, the Warsaw Uprising therefore 
becomes the axiomatic Archimedes´ point of politics of memory. 
The crucial turn was the year of 2004 (the 60th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising). However, 
president Kwaśniewski still continues with open dialogue with Germans about their controversial and 
painful common past47, a group of intellectuals around the journal Polityka teologiczna starts publicly 
denying his approach. They established a monumental Museum of Warsaw Uprising in order to 
“speak about the past in a way that the message is clear, faithful and reliable and at the same time aims 
at contemporary public.” (MWP website48) “The Museum” rehabilitates the romantic tradition of 
never ending combat of heroic Poles, some of its founders even speak about deep revisions of history 
such as the forgotten chance to really win the war with Nazis (as Szymon Nowak). With the opening 
of the museum, many streets and squares has been named in accordance with the Uprising myth (this 
includes names of famous combatants, symbols or the Warsaw Uprising itself) and the Memorial Wall 
has been raised. Many Warsaw Uprising combatants themselves speak and write against (as they feel 
to be politically abused as “election sausage”), but memory politics, as being step by step designed by 
PiS and intellectuals affiliated to it, has dominated since. (Krzemiński, Thiriet 2016; Wolff-Powęska 
                                                          
46 President Kwaśniewski used an electoral slogan saying significantly „Let´s chose the Future!“ (Fedor 2015: 
246) 
47 His main argument was that Germany is Poland´s crucial ally against Russian exegesis of the Second World 
War, and he therefore definitely helped to form the paradigm of a battle of states´ national memories as 
mentioned above.  
48 This is my own translation of the original as the english version of the site differs a lot. 
2006) To see shortly why MPW frustrates so many, we can quote Ukielski, the deputy director of the 
Museum: 
“Firstly it [MPW] shows the identity of a city wiped off the face of the Earth, secondly it 
explains the enslavement of Poland and Central Europe after the war and thirdly it is the last 
example of real German-Soviet cooperation in the desire to destroy the Polish capital.” 
(Ukielski 2011) 
The museum has nonetheless become a powerful symbol of Polish identity. As such it has been “an 
institution of recognition and identity par excellence” since. (Fedor 2015: 244)  
Polityka pamięnci as discursively stabilized49 by the politics practised by PiS and theorized by 
intellectuals connected is basically impossible to define clearly; it has always been defined only 
negatively. (Wolff-Powęska 2006) Rather than a concrete policy, now it is a prevailing political 
paradigm ruling the political situation of Poland. And any reduction of it to mere political actions is 
but misunderstanding50. (Ponczek 2013) The impact of politics of memory is, however, visible in 
many dimensions of political culture. Unfortunately, with more and more powerful politics of memory 
as a primary site of politics in Poland, usually only the normative accent is being put on any 
discussion. Political acts one can subdue under the direct influence of orientation towards the past, to 
introduce at least some of them, are always like following: severe changes in Poland´s topography51, 
educational programmes focussed on heroic past of Poles, their special role in history of the world and 
the accent on the catholic identity of Poland52, enduring harsh lustrations run by IPN, severe lawsuits 
against those who act against the historical canon53, exchange of symbols in representative places54, 
restrictions of controversial artworks55, semi-restriction of free academic enquiry56, building of new 
extremely expensive museums financed by state57, general orientation against the European Union and 
Germany, some very conservative laws introduced by the parliament and so on. (Wolff-Powęska 
2006; Kowolik 2010) 
5.5. Historical temporality of polityka pamięnci 
After a short introduction into the main argumentative strategies of intellectuals connected to Polish 
memory politics, we should elaborate on few hallmarks of the narrative structure arising from the 
analysis. 
Firstly, politics of memory do not present itself as the last combat against divisive skeletons in the 
closet before the end of history, as a showdown of post-historical people vis-a-vis their historical 
antecedents - rather refers to the tradition of history subsumed under political mobilization and social 
identity. The story narrated is as if incarnated in its living heirs. It is the narrative behind what makes 
                                                          
49 So to say, as I could not speak about it otherwise, since it has been a broad and diffused debate lately. 
50 Eugeniusz Ponczek speaks about aspects, or to say, dimensions, of politics of memory – from semantics to 
„national meritocracy“ of current regime. The vision of Poland as a historical society (in the sense of Fukuyama) 
rules partly in fact every „detailed politics“ (polityki szczególowe), such as cultural, educational etc.  
51 Not only many streets have gained new names, but also many new monuments and memorials have been 
raised. 
52 Catechism is basically obligatory in state schools, although not in theory. (cp. Karlowicz 2010) 
53 Such as was the well-known case of Jan Gross. 
54 After PiS had been elected, all clocks in the building where sits Sejm were replaced with icons of Polish saints. 
55 Movies as Ida, Pokłosie etc. 
56 Usually qua (not) financing of projects. 
57 Such as the Katyń massacre museum, the museum in Gdańsk shipyards and so on. 
Polish citizens Poles, in the view of this discourse. As such, the narrative has to be “alive” now, and 
Poles without being a part of this story, i.e. individual people of Polish nationality (as one of many 
other social identities) after the end of history, would be only penurious, awkwardly traditional and 
religious. And, foremost, always lagged behind western Europe. This pattern is clearly obvious with 
the rhetoric of “shame” and communitarian arguments of “hot” and “united” society-nation.  
To sum up the first hallmark, national narrative is the essence of social identity, and involves 
arguments of the strong feeling of belonging that arises from the past, only due to which the society 
could survive both geopolitically and morally. The threat to Polish society as to the coherent subject58 
of the narrative is now the end of history, often in the imagery of the discourse symbolized by the 
European Union or generally the Western Europe. 
Secondly, the temporal horizon is not only perceived as “always oriented towards the past” but always 
on the side of “the inner viewpoint” of narrating memory (as the opposite of storing structural history 
outside of the sphere of actual agents). Living people are the subjects of the story of Kościuszko to the 
similar extent to which I am the subject of distant episodes from my childhood. The diachronic nature 
of narrative identity does not need the subject to be “the same”, but to be “intelligibly continuous”. To 
use Sartre´s dichotomy, temporality of the discourse of polityka pamięnci narrates joining past and 
future in present, not lives with cumulating chaotic data behind.  
As such, the politics of memory promotes (1) the superiority of collective national narrative over the 
individual one, since a Pole is more worthy self-identifying himself with “being a Pole” rather than 
“being a Jerzy or Jacek”. The temporality of one-life is then embedded in the national story and the 
temporal horizon of centuries instead of decades. Instead of offering possible individual success (as 
Fukuyama´s megalothymia of scientists or entrepreneurs), it (2) offer a status of “a hero” in the meta-
story. As such, the narrative can follow completely different logic and schema, and in Fukuyama´s 
division gain a status of “historical”.    
Thirdly, symbols and heroes of the narrated story are kept alive by means of political role-playing (or 
to be more precise “archetype-playing”) of people who are identified with the canon (remember 
Kaczyński situating himself to the role of “the second wave of Freedom combatants” referring to 
Warsaw Rising) and doing the same with others, so that to create complex archetypes with 
appertaining attributes and fates, i.e. complex national preimages that are actually being used. The 
narrative such constituted is also always present through the often used and emotional chrono-topoi of 
never ending repetition of situations and schemas, which in Poland's case often means a threat of 
physical annihilation of the country, so that “Polishness in the heart” is the only safe domain of shared 
identity. Through this connection, the temporality of their past (and possible imagery of the future) 
qua the narrative is strongly cyclical, since what does matter are schemata and archetypes represented 
by individual people, deeds and situations: “they transform historically based 'symbolic analogies' into 
'illusory correlations' between national identity and the behavior of its members.” (Wawrzyński 2013) 
This is what made several scholars to speak about the “Aesopian language”; since data as 
individualized are important through the repeated intersections of meanings ascribed.  
Here we can remind ourselves of Nietzsche and connect the monumental form of history with this 
enquiry of Polish attitude: 
                                                          
58 Is is a classical rhetorical figure used by people connected to this discourse to perceive “traitors” to be not-
Poles; we can find used toward people loyal to foreign rule, disregarding whether to empires under Partitions, 
to Nazis, Communists, or currently to synecdochic “Brussel”.  
“[...] monumental history will not be able to produce that full truthfulness. It will always bring 
closer what is unlike, generalize, and finally makes things equal. It will always tone down the 
difference in motives and events, in order to set down the monumental effectus, that is, the 


























5.6. Liberal alternative 
Although single points of liberal critics vary59, they ordinarily lead up to the following statements that 
are in fact only two sides of the same coin. On the one side, the semantics of the narrative is that of  
identity conceptualized in the essentialist manner, the identity of the nation framed in mythological 
stereotyping: “The greatest threat to a nation was to lose a sense of responsibility for its own fate and 
to accept a mythology of unfreedom and victimhood. [...] if the nation was a collective that exists 
through time, it has – Poles have – no choice but to own up to their own heritage. The past had created 
debts that the present owed to the future.” (Conelly, Koncewicz 2016; cp. Wawrzyński 2013) On the 
other side, the sitting government uses self-positing into the actualized national narrative and using 
manipulative strong words ascribed to a collective subject (such as glory, heroism, slavery or 
sacrifice): “[actions of PiS] indicate the ferocity of Law and Justice’s obsession with the past. They 
also suggest that the party sees political gain in stirring up historical resentments. It plays up the most 
glorious aspects of Poland’s history, [...] At the same time, it portrays the country and its people as 
victims60, then and now.” (The Economist 2016) Historical temporalities are in general after “the end 
of history” (i.e. the end of the world of nationalisms and ideologies) perceived as perilously 
megalomaniac and essentialist. Significantly enough, to remind of one exemplary scholar, this vision 
of politics of memory would bear many well-known Eco´s signs of ur-fascism: the contempt for the 
weak, the idea that individual life is lived for struggle in name of something transcending the single 
life-story, the rejection of modernism, fear of the different, cult of tradition or last but not least: “In 
such a perspective everybody is educated to become a hero. In every mythology the hero is an 
exceptional being, but in Ur-Fascist ideology, heroism is the norm.” (Eco 1995) We have seen those 
signs are inherent to the narrative temporality of the first type of politics of memory, not merely to the 
political manipulation of its supporters. 
Now the remaining step is to look closer on the second type as we have defined it and elaborate on its 
temporal dimension. Politics liberally oriented towards the individual future after the conceptually 
accepted end of historical narratives, that aim to provide this post-historical society with examples of 
individual moral heroes, should be of exactly different temporal horizon than meta-narratively driven 
identitarian politics of memory. And yet, we will see what a paradoxical temporality they are of.  
6. The peculiar temporality of liberal politics of memory 
Focusing on the liberal politics of memory, we can observe what Nietzsche categorized as the 
antiquarian form of history. To connect it with main theories scrutinized in this paper, this form is 
trying to connect Sartre´s effort to live individual lives after the end of history that unchained the 
society from megalothymic collective narratives of previous ages with narrating of the story to the 
threshold, the story we can metaphorically learn from and use for individual morally conceived 
decisions in the space without meta-narrative structures, in the space of isothymic equals. The ended 
grand-narrative is to be an archive of various colorful voices, so to precede an emergence of one single 
normative narrative as in case of exclusive national perspective and its division of historical life-
                                                          
59 Mostly, to be accurate, critiques of governmental politics of memory arise after certain individualized actions 
and are led against them: such cases as were threats of lawsuit against Jan Gross, strong accusations of Lech 
Walesa in public speeches, artificially added epilogue to Ida when streamed by public television, suggestions 
that after using the term “death camp” in relation to Poles should follow imprisonment, commonly expressed 
repulsion of the European Union by officials etc. 
60 Anyway, we have seen that victimhood is with the same breath being talked about as being heroic victims of 
false victimization. 
stories into black and white good and bad. Except of multiplication of single voices and accent on 
“victim-memories” they say to connect those projects with history science, not with political sphere. 
6.1. Tropes of liberal politics of memory 
Concerning the narrative temporality, we can foreshadow several important patterns. First, the accent 
on the end of history in temporal aspect. If we focus on the choice of verbs liberal politics uses to 
describe its actions, we will see they are not of qualitative change, of making history - but only for 
enhancing and maintaining the status quo: “preventing” what is unwanted according to historical 
development; “commemorating” of victims (i.e. victims of history categorized in historical-political 
terms) and “raising awareness” (of how cruel past phases were while current systems are not of such 
malignant nature); “deepening” and “furthering the respect” to post-historical values of tolerance, 
individualism and parliamentary democracy, since the cases are not literally taken events and actors, 
but the patterns, structures, vectors - and as such, studying regimes of the past could help us to 
disclose and suppress potential threats by segments of post-historical society and prevent them with 
proper education of youth and “the public”. This is what we have discussed with Eyal and Todorov 
hereinbefore. 
Second, the accent on the end of history by shared meta-narrative of evolution towards post-historical 
democracy. In short, history in general is the story of the end of history as drawn by Fukuyama, and 
since we are primarily global society of individuals, history can give us examples of moral values for 
everybody, regardless of nationality. National stories are to be just interesting remnants of bygone 
historical epoch in which the liberal narrative was still lived in the sense of Sartre's distinction. After 
the end of history the reconciliation of national stories would have worked qua creating one umbrella 
story of “totalitarian legacy” of Europe and globally of “history of crimes” in universally accepted 
paradigm of human rights.  
Third, the normative coding of political terms.  Frequently used words for their preventive missions as 
“intolerance”, “extremism” or “anti-democratic movements” are but derivative from tolerance, 
normality-centrality and “democratic movements” and as such figured as secondary and unfavourable; 
usage of concepts like “genocides”, “totalitarian rule”, “crimes committed by regimes”, “threats to 
democracy” refers directly to anticipated tacit consensus between authors and readers on what and 
which those regimes were, what those crimes were and who was responsible for them (the historical 
regime itself?), that those actions were just negative in their essence without any further consideration 
of how they worked and that on the contrary the essence of democracy is positive without, again, any 
further thesis. The past reality is as such defined always as flawed and normatively negative until after 
democratic transition, and archetypal heroes in fact are who dragged the society towards it.  
Fourth, as anticipated, they emphasize the individual actors and their life-stories as intertwined with 
the meta-story of history of emancipation and democratization (as we would see if we looked into the 
archives and documentation centres of thus profiled platforms). The meta-stories of “political history” 
are subdued to narratives of single individuals living under political circumstances, who were there 
and remember better than chaotic datas.  
Given these points, where in the case of the first type we see a national narrative as an essence of 
society, here is transnational society of political nations for which the narrative at large both 
legitimizes the status quo of post-historical world and gives personalized moral examples variable for 
actual application and critical simulation of living agents. Where there is the superiority of collective 
narrative over the individual one unless taking part in the meta-story, there the temporality of the end 
of history leave the meta-story dissolved at the end to leave people following diverse paths 
individually chosen. By awarding prices to past heroes of the combat for human rights and democracy, 
such memory politics aim to reinforce ideas of those awarded in occupations that require courage and 
resolute stance nowadays61 by drawing the parallel of moral choice in tough times. By doing so, the 
second type also disposes of imagery of preimages, even though differently coded.  
6.2. Figurative language of the discourse 
Contemporary American historian and literary scientist Hayden White writes in this respect against the 
possibility of such an objective (since multiplied and personalized) discourse he calls historicism. He 
uses rhetorical analysis of the discourse, always present in its schema: 
“The facts and their formal explanation or interpretation appears as the manifest or literal 
“surface” of the discourse, while the figurative language used to characterize the facts points 
to a deep-structural meaning. The latent meaning of an historical discourse consist of the 
generic story-type of which the facts themselves, arranged in a specific order and endowed 
with different weights, are the manifest form. We understand the specific story being told 
about the facts when we identify the generic story-type of which the particular story is an 
instantiation.” (White 1986: 110) 
To put it differently, even when politics of memory do not narrate grand-narratives of nations 
(however they latently use the structure of grand-narrative of liberalization of the world society) and 
create the structure of all possible life-stories of individuals having lived under history and coping 
with historical circumstances, they in fact do narrate the grand-story if analyzed on the level of 
figurative imagination. The same process parodies Viktor Jerofejev in The encyclopedia of the Russian 
soul:  
“In Russia there is everybody superfluous. But from the social group, within which he attracts 
attention, enough to carry him over to the metaphysical group to change his vices into virtues 
and everything gains its place. Metaphysical peasants will arise, metaphysical workers shaking 
their hands, together they will stand up at the pedestal.” (Jerofejev 2011: 43) 
Individuals that are to be seen as “examples” (i.e. are on the pedestal of the narrative) are as such 
coded as synecdoches, as archetypes of the story told. In liberal archives we can find many different 
stories coded as “victims of exterior circumstances” and/or “heroes” and necessarily then as “victims 
of interior circumstances” and/or “criminals”. We can use examples from the biggest Czech archive 
Paměť národa to see the categorization: on the one side we see (1) refugees, hidden people, deported, 
forced labour, examinee of the State Secret police - state enemy, underage political prisoners etc., (2) 
Royal Air Force, Charter 77 Signatory, Dissident, The student activists during the Velvet Revolution 
in Czechoslovakia etc. On the other hand we find Border Guards, collaborators with the Soviet secret 
service, secret police informers, officials in JZD, Wehrmacht soldiers etc.62 Those agents are presented 
not as “national heroes/criminals”, but as heroes/criminals of conscience from the perspective of the 
end of history (i.e. from the perspective of democracy, human rights and tolerance, and foremost of the 
                                                          
61 Exactly this has been to see lately, while many recall the legacy of Vaclav Havel concerning the refugee crisis, 
to provide the these with an example. 
62 Noteworthy is the disbalance between “victims” and “villains” so to say: while we can trace stories of 207 
examinees of the State secret police for instance, only 6 communist interrogators and 16 secret police agents 
are to find. Categories that do not fit into the political meta-narrative are missing or weak, such as Memory of 
Czech deafs (1 person) or Gypsies (6). (http://www.pametnaroda.cz/category) 
final triumph of them). The problem arises when we are not able to find categories of individuals who 
has not been living (and thus retrospectively narrating their lives) but with the political causal and 
temporal horizon, to remind of MacIntyre. Within those politics of memory there is no space for 
individual stories as described by Helena Třeštíková´s Marriage Stories or Private Universe, Dušan 
Hanák´s Pictures of the Old World or famous Czech meretricious family-stories of Pupendo and 
Pelíšky, or collective-narratives of circus performers, of tourism in Carpathian Mountains, of station 
pub-houses etc. Minorities members are “witnesses” to the extent they represent the minority in the 
political narrative. Disabled people are “witnesses” to the extent they represent the regime actions 
against them. Witnesses of those times thus have nothing to say unless they narrate their personal story 
as framed primarily by political history from above, regardless whether advertently or not. It is 
important here to mention Petr Rezek´s essay Život disidentův jako „život v pravdě“? (“Life of a 
dissident: life in truth?”), the well-known critique of Havel´s text The power of the powerless. He 
polemizes with Havel´s dictum about “life in truth” used in the essay to define the difference between 
dissidents and ordinary people. According to him, dissidents´ lives were not ruled by reluctance to live 
in “lies” but by willingness to live in conflict, regardless what had been the first cause of the clash 
between the political structure and a dissident, and therefore: 
“The set of dissidents is thus defined by not only in the counter position to political power, but 
also to passive citizens, who are not willing to conflict. [...] Unlike a man who prefers comfort 
or avoids the conflict from other reasons, dissident is willing to this conflict - he is thus not 
only ruled by his conscience or morality, he has to manifest this willingness as well.” (Rezek 
2007: 84) 
His argumentation is close to Lawrence Langer´s division between heroic and non-heroic memory. 
Heroic memory is thus based - as well as memory of dissent - on rhetorical figures of redemption, self-respect, 
image of free will, positive values and orientation to the future. (cp. Činátl 2014: 64-65) Thus, on the one hand, we can 
see people whose stories are being able to be incorporated into the canon of multiple voices of politics 
of memory, since they are framed as “exemplary” (“metaphysical” as Jerofejev would say or 
“stereotyped” according to Wawrzyński), and on the other hand, we observe mass of “ordinary 
people” without anything to say, since the narrative schema of theirs is not intermingled and paralleled 
with grand-narrative of politics of memory. (cp. Činátl 2014: 94, 154-176, 325) 
6.3. The portal from the past to the vacuum future 
We should shortly remind of Fukuyama´s paradox: no matter irrational grand-narratives are gone with 
the historical time, people crave to belong to a broader story - as we have seen illustrated by his own 
example of Paris revolts in 1968 and Godard´s movie.63  
Fukuyama himself later admits there is still a space for such a grand-narrative after the end of history 
and mentions social inequality to be combated against. (Fukuyama 2012) However, in general  the 
combat is to be led in the name of isothymia, of democratic equality. Substantially, liberal politics of 
memory on the level of education usually operates together with other area politics oriented towards 
collective values, such as ecologic movements, third world problems, minority issues and so on, and 
as such create a complex education to democratic values. But to abstract politics of memory of the 
educational discourse, it itself promotes those values by usage of historical archetypes to be followed 
and internalized as examples of those values. Yet the problematic moment arises when we pay more 
                                                          
63 This paradox has been also thoroughly discussed in psychology and sociology within the discourse of Terror 
Management Theory. 
attention to the figurative structure within which are those examples coded - since “categories” of 
multiple voices are ordered; some of them are highlighted, some of them are marginalized or silent. 
And the concept that arises is what oral history theoretician Alessandro Portelli names hegemonic 
memory. According to him, in democracy is the clash of narratives only useful, and ostracisation of 
certain individual life-stories necessarily burden it. “Dissidents´ narratives are not necessarily more 
truthful than others,” he claims being interviewed on the campaign “against the loss of memory”64. 
(Houda 2015) But qua figurative language of heroic memory as of moral examples liberal politics of 
memory in fact creates the hegemonic discourse of heroes and those who are “ordinary” non-political 
people who are not to be followed.  
Together with Fukuyama and Rezek we can try to analyze the passage of history to post-history where 
moral values of historical heroes are merited. Since coding of heroes goes hand in hand with a will to 
live in conflict, to oppose - it requires political grand-narrative; individual willingness to help the 
elderly, to recycle waste or be a boy scout leader is not sufficient for mirroring the preimages.  
As we have seen, identitarian politics of memory is directly criticized for rising megalothymic 
political grand-narratives. But the same narrative scheme we see to be back here as a side effect of 
liberal politics again. Individualized narratives lived are not, and cannot be, of the same nature as 
politicized narratives told by witnesses interviewed due to their will to fight for their ideas. The 
paradox of liberal politics of memory is thus their aim to diffuse the narrative after democratic 
transition and to keep the division between heroes or heroes-heirs and ordinary people alive by 
figurative coding of the witnesses´ narratives chosen. The paradox of allowing grand-narratives of 













                                                          
64 Campaign was run by NGO People in Need, and aim to highlight that even after Czech transition to 
democracy there are countries of former Eastern bloc still combating for their liberalization. 
(http://www.protiztratepameti.cz/cs/o-kampani) 
Epilogue: Lot´s wife 
There is still the last question remaining. Is it even possible, to narrate the past without grand-narrating 
on the institutionalized social level?  
Brandon Stanton has in November 2010 started to photograph random people he met walking the 
streets of New York. “Somewhere along the way, I began to interview my subjects in addition to 
photographing them. And alongside their portraits, I'd include quotes and short stories from their 
lives.” (http://www.humansofnewyork.com/about) Subsequently, his project disseminated almost all 
over the globe and currently disposes of tens of thousands of short personal narratives with attached 
photos. It is up to the interviewed to speak about their lives - some speak about rural origins, some 
about careers, children, private battles with accepting their sexual orientation, illnesses and deaths of 
their parents, political struggles, education, paths to religion, immigration into the country etc. Life-
stories are perfectly dissolved and individualized. But together with resignation on the grand-narrative, 
hardly they are but private memories, connected together not by the past, but the presence of the same 
photographer who met them in one shared city. To put it differently, this diffusion of single personal 
narratives cannot be of the past oriented temporality, since the institution-photographer that collects 
them as the ordering agent is always in present, heading forward, while the individual stories are thus 
let completely by themselves, without any further meaning ascribed to their sets. Surely one can argue 
that photographer, as well as a historian, picks the personalized narratives by a certain code, might it 
be beauty, queerness, age. But behind his work, unlike a historian´s, remains no temporal depth - this 
phenomenon we can observe in movies like Dziga Vertov´s Man with the movie camera or Geoffrey 
Reggio´s “quatsi-trilogy”. They do plastically mirror the society in its diversity - by no means after the 
manner of epic narration, that creates the sense of belonging over time, but as an synchronic archive.  
These considerations bring us back to the main question of the text, however, it might have sunk under 
the circuitous argumentation line. Can past oriented narratives (as trauma healing liberal politics 
aspires) heal the society from megalothymic history? Or is it inherent in their narrative temporality to 
keep forthcoming generations within its past story, to restrain splitting into several contested life-
stories (as identitarian conservative politics of memory aims)? 
We could now perhaps very shortly remind ourselves of the line we followed through the text to 
conclude it. We have seen diverse paths a subject can follow regarding the question of identity over 
time and we have divided the temporality of the self into petrified structure and lived present, to see 
what an important role plays narrative in bringing it together. We have also identified the narrative of 
diachronic entity with the means of joining together multiple agents under one grand-narrative. We 
have subsequently called into question the necessity of the past narrative by introducing several 
contesting temporalities of political narratives, and stopped for a while at the end of history and the 
role it plays in temporal aspect of politics nowadays. 
Politics of memory on the edge of the end of history, we have seen, can deny it and render the politics 
to be of historical nature and use the historical grand-narrative as a means to this political end. Their 
temporality embraces both the past and the future, ignoring the end of history as false hypothesis or 
the last threat for diachronic identity of united society. The past narrative here rules the future, that is 
to be but embedded in the story with archetypes and topoi having been already coded.  
Society can anyway both, accept the end of history as a fact, and simultaneously run politics of 
memory. Such projects would conceptualize themselves as being the means of healing the society 
from history of competing narratives under the single global narrative of liberalization of men that 
does not belong to anybody more than to others, as in the case of grand-narratives of the past. Since 
the essence of collective narrative identity after the end of history is multiplicity, equality and 
tolerance of individualized narratives, politics of memory is bound to highlight individual stories from 
the past, since an individual agent is not to identify with struggling grand-narratives as well. But we 
have seen that even if this ambition is fulfilled, politics of memory narrates after the manner of past 
oriented grand-narratives it condemns, and paradoxically allows historical megalothymia to smuggle 
into the post-historical world as well by political figuration of individualized narratives it promotes.  
Running from history, burning trauma of twentieth century, the last mundane armageddon, individuals 
free themselves from being primarily characters in the grand-story of society as before. After history 
fades away equal individual narratives run by their proponents themselves will be the ideal. With those 
smouldering wreckage of history present in memory of living generations, we find ourselves in the 
position of Lot and his family escaping from Sodom and Gomorrah to start again, by their own. 
(Harries 2007) Lot´s wife´s fate thus was not to die in the traumatic event, she lived the history of the 
destruction through and did escape the end of the shared city. But glancing back, she petrified, bound 
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